



**MARINE CORPS
GAZETTE**



Marine Corps Gazette

JULY 1950

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Opinions expressed in the Marine Corps GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

THIS MONTH'S COVER: A tank from the company attached to the 8th Marines (Reinforced) is shown landing on the island of Crete last August. For an up-to-date account of what duty in the Mediterranean is like, read *To The Shores of Tripoli*, by LtCol Charles L. Banks, in the August GAZETTE.

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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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THIS MONTH AND NEXT—A glance at the masthead will show some new names on our Editorial Board. To the old members who have been transferred and relieved of the extra duty of reading manuscripts, casting votes for or against them, and generally supervising our stewardship, we wish the best of luck in their new assignments. To the new members, whose extra duty tours with the GAZETTE have just begun, we say welcome.

In this issue we begin an article which reached us too late to be publicized in this column last month: *Guerrilla*, by Col Samuel B. Griffith II. This article merits every reader's attention.

Next month will bring *Strategic Planning* by LtCol Samuel D. Mandeville, Jr; another Aggressor article—*The 13th Fusiliers*, by 1stLt James A. MacDonald, Jr; the concluding installment of *Guerrilla*, and many other features.

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WHAT'S DOING

at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft?

The most powerful jet engine now streaking through the skies in the United States is the J-48 Pratt & Whitney Turbo-Wasp. Already it is flying in two of the most advanced special-purpose fighter planes for both the Navy and the Air Force.

One is the sleek Grumman Panther (F9F-5) for Navy carrier-based operations. Another is North American's swept-wing F-93A deep penetration fighter for the Air Force. Both of these first-line military aircraft are capable of speeds in the transonic range — 600 miles an hour plus. The J-48 gives to each of these airplanes more power than a four-engined bomber of World War II.

Two of the world's foremost aircraft engine manufacturers — Pratt & Whitney Aircraft and Rolls-Royce, Ltd. — pooled their engineering talents to develop the J-48. And, working independently of its British partner, Pratt & Whitney made a major contribution to improved performance by perfecting an afterburner. It provides greatly increased thrust for take-offs, climb and for short bursts of extra speed in combat.

This hands-across-the-sea teamwork saved time and money, produced a jet engine more powerful than its competitors, and made it available to military services of both countries much sooner than otherwise would have been possible.

Before its successful flights in military fighter planes, the J-48 had completed nearly two thousand hours of ground development testing and several grueling 150-hour endurance tests. During those tests, the engine delivered considerably more power than its guaranteed ratings, both with and without afterburner.

Such extensive flight and ground tests help make it possible to give the J-48 Turbo-Wasp the same built-in dependability and high performance that always has been the hallmark of Pratt & Whitney piston engines — engines that power so many military and commercial airplanes.

The J-48 is the logical successor to the J-42 jet, which has been in production for the Navy more than a year. But the J-48 is not the final answer to aircraft power requirements. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft's engineering and development teams have even further advanced turbojet and turboprop engines running as complete units on experimental test.

HOW MUCH POWER IS PRODUCED BY THE J-48 TURBO-WASP?

- 8,000 Hp.?
- 9,000 Hp.?
- 10,000 Hp.?
- 11,000 Hp.?



Jet power is measured in terms of pounds of thrust, but, as you know, it can be translated into horsepower. The J-48, which has a basic dry thrust rating of 6,250 pounds, will provide the equivalent of about 11,000 horsepower for a fighter plane at high operating speeds. That's more than four times the power output of the most powerful fighter of World War II. Water injection and an afterburner give the J-48 even greater power increases for short periods.

HOW WAS THE J-48 MADE MORE POWERFUL THAN THE J-42?

- Increased Airflow?
- Greater Diameter?
- Longer
Turbine Blades?



One of the toughest problems in designing the J-48 was to increase airflow without increasing engine diameter. By redesigning the impeller to compress more air and by lengthening turbine blades, the engineers increased air consumption by 30 percent and that, in turn, produced more thrust power. It sounds simple, now that it has been accomplished. But it required thousands of hours of designing and testing, first of component parts and finally of completed engines. And yet the over-all diameter of the J-48 is only 50 inches — almost exactly the same as the J-42.

WHAT IS THE RATIO OF POWER TO WEIGHT OF THE J-48?


- 1 to 1?
- 2 to 1?
- 4 to 1?
- 5 to 1?



The goal of one horsepower for every pound of engine weight was reached by piston engine manufacturers only after years of effort. But in the field of jet power that ratio has already been far exceeded. The J-48 weighs less than 2,000 pounds and, at the high operating speeds of the fighters in which it is installed, it delivers the equivalent of more than *five* horsepower per pound of engine weight.

WHEN WILL THE J-48 BE IN ACTUAL PRODUCTION?

- Summer 1950?
- Fall 1950?
- Winter 1950?
- Spring 1951?



The first experimental model of the J-48 Turbo-Wasp was installed, after extensive testing, in a Grumman F9F in November, 1949. Next came the pre-production engines, several of which are now installed in combat aircraft. Currently, production tooling is well along and the first production engine is scheduled to roll off the line early this fall. Even as this work goes on, Pratt & Whitney engineers are following their historical pattern of simultaneously producing the best engines today and continuing research for even better power plants tomorrow.



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TO THE EDITOR

Message Center



Wrong Name . . .

DEAR SIR:

The Public Information Officer made a slight error when he released the picture of King Paul of Greece inspecting the USS *Newport News* Marine Guard which was published on page 43 of your May issue. The captain standing by is F. W. Baker, Jr., Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment, USS *Newport News*.

The error arose through the fact that I am also aboard the same ship but in the capacity of Commanding Officer, Fleet Marine Force Troops, comprising Co A, 1st Bn, 6th Marines (Reinf.).

BENSON A. BOWDITCH
Capt, USMC

Mechanization Argument . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have been following the exchange of letters between Lieutenant Colonels Stuart and Walt with regard to the mechanization of our Fleet Marine Force and, after reading Col Walt's letter in the April GAZETTE, I'd like to contribute my two cents worth to the argument, if I may.

History has taught us that whenever a new weapon or a new technique is developed it is only a matter of time before the advantage gained is nullified by the development of counter measures. The weapons and technique of the amphibious assault developed prior to and during World War II proved highly successful. That these same weapons and techniques will be successful if we are to employ them in a third world

war is, however, doubtful. It is very likely that unless we conceive and develop new ideas of the amphibious attack we may end up with a bloody nose on some enemy defended beach. For my money, if it appears to our advantage to land from helicopters, or to land armor in the first wave followed by motorized infantry, I'm all for it. If we are to follow Col Walt's line of thinking we could well be still depending upon the 75mm pack howitzer for artillery support and on the motor launch to transport us from the ship to the beach.

I also find it difficult to follow Col Walt's line of reasoning when he says that "from the mission assigned the Marine Corps, by law, it was not intended that it should become a mechanized force." I believe the mission assigned us by law says that the Marine Corps will have a Fleet Marine Force of combined arms, including aviation, for the purpose of seizing and defending advance naval bases and conducting limited amphibious operations necessary to prosecute the naval campaign. To me that carries no restriction as to how the Fleet Marine Force is to be organized. It does mean to me, however, that we, as the amphibious experts having the responsibility, in conjunction with the other services, of developing amphibious techniques, are charged with organizing our forces to best insure success in battle. And to continue this thought still further I do not understand why Col Walt insists that the Fleet Marine Force must be organized on the premise that the average consolidated beachhead to be secured by a Marine landing force will have a maximum depth of approximately 12 miles. Did I hear someone suggest that perhaps this is the atomic era and maybe things might have to be modified slightly to take care of the necessary dispersion?

R. P. ROSS, JR.,
Col, USMC

Raiders . . .


DEAR SIR:

As a former member of the 1st Marine Raider Battalion, I take exception to LtCol Heinl's statement which I quote from his article, *Vanishing Art* as it appeared in the April issue of the GAZETTE. "The entire 'raider' concept, especially in its Gung Ho aspects during the past war, came in for a deservedly bad professional name as being synonymous with indiscipline, aggressive nonconformity, and combat snafu."

The 1st Marine Raider Battalion, formed and trained under the command of Col Merritt A. Edson (now MajGen, Ret'd) was one of the best trained and most strictly disciplined or-

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ganizations the Marine Corps has ever had. It was trained and disciplined according to the book. Its distinguishing factors were that it was formed entirely of volunteers; it differed slightly in organization and equipment from the normal infantry battalion due to its expected employment, and in addition to regular infantry training, it concentrated on individual combat, night tactics and rubber boat landings.

After a very tough six-month training period at Quantico, American Samoa and New Caledonia, the battalion was at its peak of combat readiness and efficiency and landed in the assault on Tulagi Island 7 August 1942.

I believe that the record this battalion made in the Guadalcanal Campaign under the command of Col Edson and in the New Georgia Campaign under the command of Col Samuel B. Griffith II, is sufficient evidence to prove its ability as a fighting organization and to win it a position of highest esteem and honor in the history of our Corps.

L. W. WALT,
LtCol, USMC

Polls . . .

DEAR SIR:


As an amateur statistician, I must rise to the defense of MSgt Walter Bandyk (and indirectly Dr George Gallup) in the exchange of letters in the March issue concerning Joe Blow—*Morale Builder*.

Lt Morrison and MSgt Stolley mentioned in their article that 75 per cent of the men in the Marine Corps enlisted for travel and adventure. Upon the questioning of that statistic, the authors stated that it was obtained by "polls" conducted on two occasions, one each in the St. Louis and Norfolk areas. However, from their description it appears that they applied most unorthodox "polling" methods in which the final result could not help but have been a quite subjective opinion on the part of the "interviewer" regarding the "real" reason for enlisting. In other words, they did not guard against the influence of the attitude of the person doing the interviewing; they did not employ objective techniques. Thus, what they report may be in large part a reflection of beliefs of the interviewers.

The effect of such attitudes, even though unconscious, is known to be very strong. There is the classic example of two interviewers, professional prohibitionist and a minister, who questioned the inhabitants of "skid row" concerning the cause of their downfall. The prohibitionist reported that most bums attributed their downfall to drink, while the minister reported that most bums gave as the cause of their downfall lack of religion!!

Even though "pollsters" were somewhat discredited by the last national election, their methodology finds daily application in such varied fields as agriculture, psychological research, and manufacturing. (Where their techniques are subjected to more rigorous tests than were the election predictions). In any event, statistical procedures involve: description of the popula-

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tion, a sampling process, test of significance, and so on.

Authors Morrison and Stolley might have coppered their bets by describing their "population" as "of considerable number of Marines interviewed we interpreted that in spite of their official reasons, 75 per cent really enlisted for travel and adventure." Instead, they are now out on the same limb with Gallup, Crosley, and Roper (and if your memory is long enough, the *Literary Digest*).

Early in 1947 a reputable commercial agency conducted a poll of nation-wide scope to determine what factors attract men of military age to enlist in the Marine Corps. They found that only 12½ per cent sought travel and adventure. In an intra-service study made in October 1948 (utilizing recognized techniques) it was learned that 29 per cent of one-year enlistees were motivated by the prospects of educational and vocational experience while only 9 per cent enlisted for travel and adventure. At the same time it was determined among three-year enlistees that 43 per cent were attracted by the educational angle, 11 per cent by adventure. It should be noted that these three polls tend to substantiate one another even though the populations differed. And incidentally, one 3 per cent mentioned security!

So what? It all started with an excellent article on public information; now we're quibbling about polling.

MIKE C. PERSAD

Languages . . .

DEAR SIR:

The letter of Lt Thomas D. Smith, Jr. and the article of LtCol Roger Willock entitled *Marine Officer—Discípulo de Lenguajes*, both of which appeared in your January issue, appalled me. Just where did the Marines fight in World War II? Was it in South America, Europe, or in the Pacific?

Lt Smith criticizes Lt Russel S. Hibbs' suggestion that officers be required to become bilingual before their promotion to rank of captain and states that the Marine Corps Institute has available courses in French and Spanish. Col Willock in his article carries this suggestion further by stating that French is used by 69 million, Spanish by 103 million, Portuguese by 43 million, and Swedish by 6 million. With due respect to these languages, how much more important it is to consider Chinese employed by 500 million, Japanese employed by 100 million, and the Chinese ideographs which are employed by both the Chinese and Japanese.

China and Japan are important geographically, politically, and economically. In our attempt to sell democracy and ourselves to these peoples, should we make an exception of these languages, and should not these languages have precedence over French, Spanish, Portuguese and Swedish?

Chinese and Japanese are more than languages; the ideographs portray the philosophy and culture of the peoples and their usage divulges history, tradition, and social concepts of these peoples. How much are these richer than French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Swedish?

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(Please Print Clearly)

I graduated in Japanese from the Naval Language School at Boulder. Since graduation, I have had no opportunity to review nor to use my Japanese. Would it not be well for the Marine Corps to implement those graduates of the Naval Language School with practice, review, and added training? Many of us are eager to refresh our schooling and are willing to devote concentrated effort but thus far have no such opportunity. I believe the Marine Corps should provide such opportunities of study to the same extent that line officers may refresh their line duty abilities.

JOSEPH M. BERGER,
1st Lt, USMCR

Sympatico . . .

DEAR SIR:

With reference to Maj Haynes' comments entitled "Sympatico" (GAZETTE, April 1950), the author of the article in question, *Marine Officer—Discípulo de Lenguajes* (GAZETTE, January 1950), desires to make the following statements.

The author will not dispute Maj Haynes' contentions that the former's attempts to put over his main theme appear to be "lengthy" and "unconvincing"; however, the statement, "The approach to the problem is a little misguided," is a matter somewhat open to debate.


The author's main theme was (and is) that: "—it would not appear inconsistent to at least provide the opportunities for such of our *younger officers of field grade* as are desirous of, and have the requisite aptitude for, attending courses of language instruction in existing Army or Navy foreign language schools." His considered opinion on this matter was (and is) summarized by the final sentence: "Over a period of time if enough officers could arrive at *some degree of familiarity* with these different languages, and then pool their abilities, we at least could have a nucleus of foreign language speaking officers who might be of invaluable assistance for staff and operational duties in the event we are called upon to participate in an allied amphibious operation at some future date on the European continent."

The author's approach to the problem was largely based on his personal experiences in the Latin American theater of operations before, during, and after the unpleasantness of 1939-45 wherein two on-the-spot observations were cited by way of example—the case of Gen Highflyer and Capt Mouthpiece, and the case of a West Indian naval officer and the skipper of an American subchaser. Either of the two cited incidents might well have taken place in other geographic locations on this globe; consequently, the intention of the author was to stress the need of good will and mutual understanding in promoting friendly relations with personnel of allied powers the world over. A "sympatico" rating is not something confined to Latin America—it is a desired quality in dealing with foreigners in any part of the world.

The author is reminded of the well-worn military maxim to the effect that the platoon leaders (company commanders) of to-day form the material from which the division (corps) com-

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
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manders of to-morrow may be selected. If we accept this principle would it not be most propitious to at least give some thought and to make some adequate provision at this time, if nothing else simply as a matter of insurance, for training *some* of our younger officers in language instruction so that they may better be able to understand and to cooperate more fully with our foreign language speaking allies. In other words, as Maj Haynes has so stated, the basic reason for language proficiency in the Marine Corps is for the development of *intelligence* in time of peace as well as war. Likewise, major emphasis should be placed not only on learning the foreign languages of our allies but also of our most probable adversaries.

No further questions. Your witness, Major—

ROGER WILLOCK,
LtCol, USMCR


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"... Ocean highways and cargo ships which sail upon them constitute much the greatest transportation system in the world. Control over this vast movement of oceanborne freights is the basic mission of navies. . . ."

Naval Campaigns


By Commodore Dudley W. Knox

GREAT FLEETS DISPUTING WITH EACH OTHER FOR control of the sea is a form of naval warfare which now seems to be in eclipse for some decades at least. However some of us seem to be prone to overlook the fact that fleet contests are merely a means to a more fundamental end. Ocean highways and the cargo ships which sail upon them constitute much the greatest transportation system of the world. The economy of all countries is vitally linked to it. Control over this vast movement of ocean-

borne freights is the basic mission of navies. That is what fleets fight for, as a step towards the actual exercise of sea control, once it is won.

By trojan efforts in World War II, naval power hostile to the United States and her sympathetic Allies was virtually eliminated. For their surviving navies it now remains only to implement control of the sea for the security of commerce during peace and war, and for purposes of military-naval operations in wartime.

"... Within the last few years we have been beguiled with the prospect of strategic bombing of Russia; taking off from American shores, flying nonstop to target, and returning home without benefit to intermediate bases. . . ."



Despite long range bombers, the taking and holding of advanced air and naval bases will be just as important in a future war as it was in World War II. To accomplish the mission of capturing overseas bases for airfields, the Navy and Marines will be needed

Russia-baiting may be an overplayed pastime. Mr Kennan, among the greatest authorities on Russian affairs, maintains the view in recent press articles that the Kremlin prefers aggressive expansion through political infiltration, rather than by war. Yet he feels that war may nevertheless be a possibility for which we should be prepared. In its main aspect such a war would probably be a Russian attempt to overrun western Europe. To stem such a tidal wave, a maximum of American military aid would obviously be called for on the continent, with our Navy in its traditional supporting role of maintaining the oceanic lines of supply, as a principal mission.

Since submarines constitute nearly all the naval power that Russia could bring to bear against ocean communications, in both the Atlantic and Pacific, it follows that a large proportion of our naval effort would lie in the realm of anti-submarine warfare. This would necessarily

located bases in the Marianas, well within the nonstop flying range of heavily loaded B-29s. Many missions had been flown when the Air Force urgently requested that Iwo Jima be taken as an intermediate base. WHY?

The question is best answered by quoting from a release issued by the headquarters of Gen Arnold in Washington, as follows:

"From 4 March 1945 to 15 June 1945 upwards of 12,000 crew members of the 1185 B-29s landing there (Iwo) for emergency refuelling or repairs have had occasions to bless the Marines. When the field or fields have been constructed, making staging operations possible, bombloads will be considerably increased. It is estimated that take-off from the Saipan and Tinian bases, flight to target (Japan) and return to Iwo Jima for fuel will permit a B-29 to carry 16,000 pounds of bombs on high altitude missions, as against the 6,000 pounds of

of the Future

be world-wide in scope because of the great cruising range of modern submarines. And our far-flung submarine-killer squadrons, with their aviation components, could not maintain secure sea lanes without numerous bases of operation. As ever, the Navy would thus require the aid of its indispensable brothers-in-arms—the Marines.


Bases overseas—and hence Marines—would also enter into the over-all picture in another big way. Within the last few years we have been beguiled with the prospect of strategic bombing of Russia; taking off from American shores, flying nonstop to target, and returning home without benefit of intermediate bases. This obviously implies a considerably lessened need of naval and Marine forces in support. Although other bombing enterprises may require bases provided and held through naval-marine effort, here is a major one that theoretically dispenses with such help.

My view is that in the crucible of war, hard, cold reality will give place to such theory; that fact and logic will force an irresistible demand for intermediate bases, even in the case of a long distance bombing project that may be initiated without them. The saga of Iwo Jima illustrates what I mean. Thanks to the Marines the strategic bombing of Japan had begun from conveniently

bombs now carried. For flight from (Saipan-Tinian) base to Iwo Jima, refuel and flight to target and back to base (Saipan-Tinian) will permit 20,000 pounds of bombs to be carried."

There we have the compelling logic of reality. Since Iwo was half way to target, a stop there on either the outward or homeward flight reduced the longest leg flown to three-fourths of the round trip distance; a saving of one fourth. The consequent saving in fuel-load made it possible to triple the bomb-load. Had Iwo been big enough for use as a main base, and served as a substitute for Saipan-Tinian, the bomb-load could have been multiplied by six—compared with the non-availability of Iwo at all.

• THUS in principle, moving up the foremost base half the distance to target, multiplies effectiveness over the target by about six, in terms of bomb-load. Of course aviators may prefer not to utilize all this gain by increasing the weight of bombs carried. Instead they may choose more gun-power, or heavier armor or increased speed. However that may be, the basic, inescapable fact remains of an enormously bettered effectiveness over the target—the one hot-spot where pilots pray for all the effective-



Until the day when giant planes can carry payloads of men and equipment on a substantial scale, the oceans will still provide our highroads of invasion. In World War II, LSTs were crammed, like this one on its way to Cape Gloucester.

ness that Allah in his benign wisdom will grant. Gravity itself could not be more certain in its pull than this influence favoring bases.

Yet there are other strong factors pulling in the same direction. Among these is the increased number of missions to target, per plane. With the flight distance halved each plane might attack the objective nearly twice as often. This would be equivalent to approximately doubling the total available effective numbers. Or to put the case in another way, we could get the same effect at the target with nearly half the number of planes that would be necessary when restricted to the more distant base.

The foregoing analysis outlines only the military fea-

tures of the problem. The economic side is equally striking. B-36s cost about six million dollars each. A few hundred of them strains the national economy. The above operational figures indicate that 240 B-36s using only the American continent for basing, are little better than 20 of them based at a half-way forward point. This because each one of the 20 could visit the target nearly twice as often, and exert six times the effect, compared with the work of each one of the 240 group. Here is a difference in cost of approximately 1.3 billion dollars between the two general methods; one with no intermediate base and the other using a base at a half-way point.

Confronted by such obvious military and economic advantages there would be every reason for using more than one intermediate base. From the half-way point we might again halve the distance to target and thus double our gains once more. And so on. Let no sailor or marine ever doubt that in the scorching heat of war, with victory and our civilization in the balance, he will be called on to do or die in taking and holding advanced air and naval

bases, regardless of any pretty peacetime theory.

Where? We cannot consider strategy divorced from geography. In the Pacific theatre obvious probabilities lie along the fringe of eastern Asia, including the vast span of off-lying islands. We already have footholds in Alaska, Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines as take-offs for bombing and for further projection of bases westward.

More intricate, and more important on account of many political and other reasons, is the situation confronting us in the Atlantic. It is well to recall the lessons of the last war. Strategic bombing was proved to be a paying proposition with only two types of targets—trans-



Supplies in tremendous quantities are needed to launch an invasion. Shown here are a few of the ships which took part in the Okinawa campaign. In the foreground is lumber for dunnage and construction, brought all the way from the United States. Over 1400 ships were required for the Okinawa invasion.

portation systems and fuel oil installations. When bombing is effective against these, general industry is paralyzed and large-scale army movements are stalled. This seems to offer the best means of preventing the Red Army from over-running western Europe.

Where would advanced bases best serve this purpose? Along the northern route Greenland and Iceland are clearly good first stepping stones eastward, assuming the consent of their respective governments. Next come the British Isles and Norway, again with reservations as to governmental consent, which in both cases seems doubtful, so close are they to powerful Russian counter-measures. In view of Norway's accessibility from Russia by land it would be a hard fight to maintain a base there, yet the position is so good that the attempt might be well worth while, especially so if the great strength of Sweden were on our side.

Air attack from these northern positions could reach only the communications of the Red Army and the greater cities of western Russia. Her main oil facilities in the Caspian-Ural region, as well as industries there would remain quite immune. Thus crippling air attack would require bases in the south as well. For this, Marines may well tread "the sands of Tripoli" once again.

The 2,000 mile span from Sardinia and Tunisia eastward through Greece and Turkey flanks the general body of Russian strength that would necessarily come into play in a major attack against western Europe. Bombers having a striking range of 1,000 miles, if based in this eastern Mediterranean vicinity could over-reach Moscow and Berlin. They could also bomb industries east of the Ural Mountains near the latitude of Moscow. The vast oil fields and installations in the southern Urals and about the Caspian Sea lie but a few hundred miles from eastern Turkey. The same radius encompasses key transportation systems and industries in the Ukraine.

Such manifest and manifold advantages will warm a bomber's heart in favor of attack from southern bases. Should Italy, Greece and Turkey be non-available for political reasons or from enemy action, other localities only moderately further from the indicated targets could readily be used for bases. Northern Africa, safe from possible land attack, as well as Syria, Palestine and Arabia have alluring potentialities. The eastern Mediterranean in general seems to be a region which may urgently require Naval and Marine attention should the little-wanted all-out contest with the Russian giant unhappily become necessary.


USMC



Presented in concert with Maj. Santelmann conducting, the Band looks as military as the marches it plays. The Band's repertoire is not limited to marches, however, for its library of music dates back to 1798, the year of its founding. Maj. Santelmann (right) is the son of another famous Marine Band leader and composer.

1798-1950


This month marks the 152nd anniversary of the founding of the United States Marine Band by President John Adams. In the long course of its existence the Band has led a colorful, and useful, life. Young boys have made it a career and grown gray in following their profession in this famous service band. Long known as "the President's own," the Band has played such tunes as "Denmark" for Jefferson, "The Girl I Left Behind Me" for Jackson, "If You Ain't Broke, I'll Be Damned" for Lincoln, and "Home on the Range" for F. D. Roosevelt. The November issue will carry a feature article on the Marine Band.



1909: The elder Santelmann was leader when this picture was taken at corn festival, Mitchell, S. D. Building in background was made of corn cobs.



1891: The Band when John Philip Sousa (shown with baton in hand) was the leader. Sousa, the march king, wrote "Semper Fidelis" in honor of the Corps.



Mr. Lewis Is Answered

By SSgt Donald F. Ball

IN THE LIMITED FORMAL INSTRUCTION I HAVE HAD IN the field of public information,* I have learned one thing—to get the facts. Evidently 1stLt Cecil P. Lewis, must be guided by somewhat different precepts because his article *Reporters for Newsmen* in the March, 1950 issue of the Marine Corps GAZETTE seems mostly to be made up of generalizations and vague conclusions.

One basic fact should be stated first—THE WAR IS OVER. Mr Lewis bemoans the lack of headlines and stories which he claims the Marines should be grabbing now as they did during the war. The contention is raised that the lack of newspaper space and radio time devoted to the Marine Corps is due to the loss of trained professional newspaper and radio men who filled the Corps' public information ranks during wartime and who returned to civilian life in peacetime. I heartily disagree.

At the present time the strength of the Marine Corps is about one-sixth of its war strength. With only one-sixth the number of men to write about and publicize, copy would naturally tend to drop off about five-sixths.

Besides, during the war Marines were making history—thrilling, stirring history—with headlines shouting Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, etc. You could have written those stories in pidgin English and the press and radio greedily would have consumed every word.

Today, Marines, for the most part, are performing

Graduated 1st in class of 28, Naval Journalist School, September, 1948.


rather drab, uninteresting, routine duties. The war glamour is gone; the Corps is no longer vital, exciting news. Therefore, I advance the proposition that the proportionate lack of space the Marine Corps is accorded in the various media is due, not to the loss of professional newspaper and radio men, but primarily because of the smaller, peacetime size of the Corps which simply is not making the news it did during wartime.

I am one of those "who had never handled public information work . . . suddenly been assigned a typewriter . . . and told they are IT." As one of those who stepped into the shoes of a wartime public information man (an insurmountable task, according to Mr Lewis, because I was a regular Marine) and proceeded to write newspaper copy and radio scripts and placed them in the media concerned, I will acknowledge many errors, faux pas, and faulty judgment both on my own part and on the part of my contemporaries.

However, at the same time, I shall ask recognition for the work done in keeping the Marine Corps before the public in an era when

we had to and are bucking the postwar apathy towards all things military.

Public information personnel today must contend with the "jingling" competition of other branches of the Armed Forces—something unknown during the lush war years. I wonder if Mr Lewis ever tried to "sell" an editor on printing gratis an article and/or photo which would advertise Marine Corps recruiting when he had been preceded by a representative of the Army and Air Force



At the close of WW II the Marine Corps lost most of its professional newspaper men. Today graduates of service schools of journalism are working at the task of keeping the Corps before the public under unusual handicaps, and they are doing an excellent job



which pay for their advertising in cold, hard cash.

Under odds such as these even Mr Lewis would agree that a professional newspaper man would have a hard time getting his material in print. But most of the post-war Marine Corps public information personnel have taken such odds in their stride and have come out on top to the best of their ability with the limited tools and materials on hand.

Mr Lewis' solution to his so-called problem is to take newly-commissioned second lieutenants and permit them to get a year of actual experience working on a newspaper or at a radio station.

First, this idea is not new. The Army and Air Force already have a similar plan in operation.

Second, the Marine Corps has the solution worked out. Rather than waste the time spent training a newly-commissioned line officer in field work, it is provided in the new Military Occupational Specialty Manual which went into effect 1 October, 1949, that a public information officer will be of warrant grades. This, naturally, provides an incentive for the enlisted man who is in public

information to work for professional excellence in his specialty.

To provide the basic background and training in public information work, two excellent service schools have been made available to Marine Corps public information personnel. One of them is the Naval Journalist School at the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, and the other is the Armed Forces Public Information School at Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

If there is anything wrong with this plan, it is that it has not yet been implemented. There have been no warrant officer promotions in the field of public information and line officers are still filling public information billets.

The year's practical experience plan is a good idea—for the selected enlisted men who are warrant officer material. But the Marine Corps certainly would not gain from the plan whereby a line officer is dumped for a year in a newspaper office or radio station to later become during his entire service career "neither quite fish nor fowl."

USMC



West Berlin anti-Communist trade unionists gather for May Day speeches. Political chaos followed in wake of defeat.


■ TODAY THERE IS NO ROOM IN THE MILITARY MIND FOR the phrase "First line of defense" as far as our country is concerned. History indicates that our economic independence and geographic position justified our traditional isolationist policy. But the world of today is so contracted both in time and in space as to necessitate, from a national security standpoint, a sensitive alertness by the United States to events transpiring all over the globe. Our country cannot adopt a defensive attitude. We can-

not allow any potential enemy to grasp the initiative in the political, economic, psychological, and military fields. We have to adopt "A first line of offense" if we are to maintain our position as the bulwark of democracy—yes, if we are to exist!

What must the United States do in order to maintain "a first line of offense"? First, we must have clear-cut national policies. Then, armed with accurate and timely intelligence our military establishment will be able to consider the vari-

By M. H. Williams

First Line of Offense



To be effective, political, economic, and psychological measures must be backed by force: 8th Army units in Tokyo.

ous possible combinations in the employment of available political, economic, psychological and military resources. It is the military leaders who are charged with the study of the capabilities of any and every possible future opponent of the United States. With this study in mind, a comparative appraisal of our own available resources will form the basis for flexible plans for the attainment of national objectives. The military must insure that the resources of the country will be used economically, that implementation of our defense plans are not complicated, and that one national aim is not jeopardized in attaining another.

History indicates that the United States has invariably

relied upon military force to protect its national interests and to achieve its national objectives. However, the destructive power of modern weapons—and science is improving them with every passing day—indicates clearly the dangerous implications of such reliance in the future. From a strictly military point of view, the Allies won a conclusive victory in World War II. Yet today the United States is spending lives and huge amounts of money to rebuild the political and economic structure of our former enemies. Not so long ago the Germans, Italians, and Japanese were hated, yet now we would undo that destruction and attempt to find common ground for political, economic and cultural collaboration.

The world is now divided into two great camps: Soviet Russia and her satellites; and the United States and her adherents. If stability and a modicum of peace in the world are to be realized, we must answer the challenge of Communism with faith and vision

We must turn again to history in order to discover the reasons for our ability to win wars and yet lose the peace. The key word is "coalition." In the past it has been characteristic of wars fought by coalitions that, while on many occasions outstanding military success has been achieved, on no occasion has any satisfactory degree of political and economic success been attained. Rather, wars won by coalitions have had the effect of creating political and economic situations which make inevitable attempts to resolve the tensions created by the peace settlement through the medium of another war.

While World Wars I and II provide the most striking and familiar examples, within the memory of all, of this characteristic of coalition wars, it can be seen in the case of all coalition wars of the past. In our own Revolutionary War, for example, the war aims of the members of the coalition of colonies, which prosecuted the war against England, were certainly more nearly unified than has generally been the case among separate nations. Yet, even in this case the political and economic compromises and coercions incident to the negotiations for establishing the peace and founding our country created tensions which set the stage for the Civil War. These tensions were resolved, finally, only through the conquest of the South by the closely knit industrial North.

The fundamental weakness of coalitions is due in large measure to the concept of war which considers military operations as something entirely apart from political and economic operations. This concept permits the formation of a coalition for the prosecution of a war against a common enemy by nations who have widely divergent political and economic aims. World Wars I and II have demonstrated forcefully the fallacy of this concept. In an age in which wars have become struggles between peoples rather than struggles between armies, and in which wars are fought with the entire integrated resources of groups of nations, it is difficult to understand how the myth, that military and political considerations can be separated, continues to find credence. Certainly, the fact that within the last 30 years we have won two great wars quite decisively in a military way, and by so doing have achieved no result except to create throughout the world political and economic chaos, should make it strikingly clear that there is something radically wrong with our method of waging war.

In general, throughout our history the average professional American officer had been rather thoroughly

indoctrinated with the idea that the sole objective of war, insofar as he was concerned, was the defeat or destruction, in the field, of the enemy military forces. His definitions of tactics and strategy were restricted to the forces of his own service, and in general, were some variation of those propounded at the Military Academy. These restricted strategy to "the art of moving armies within the theater of war," and tactics to "the science of disposing forces on the battlefield." The professional officer was completely unsympathetic with the political implications of any line of action. The very word politics had an evil connotation which placed it beneath the consideration of the American military. If the political problems connected with war were considered at all they were brushed aside as something for a civilian agency to solve after the war was over. Consideration of economic factors was confined to consideration of the location of the enemy's physical plant and the means available for destroying or crippling it by direct or indirect military action without regard or anticipation of future consequences. Psychology, history (except military history), geography (except terrain appreciation), civil government, sociology, et cetera were all subjects which were considered to have no application in a military situation and therefore were not included within the scope of the American officer's educational curriculum.

• EVEN the State Department representatives, during World War II, shared with the military commanders the concept that the principal objective, for the time being, was the defeat of the enemy forces in the field and that political matters should be left to the State Department for solution after this objective was accomplished.

Fortunately the leaders of our national defense establishment, as well as those in the State Department, realize today that these faults must be corrected and are doing something about the matter. The results are gratifying and add further emphasis for the need of "A first line of offense."

But there is another aspect which must be considered in the light of our national security. The all encompassing totalitarian effort which our country would be called upon to make in the event of another war might create the very conditions in our homeland that we are trying to eliminate in other areas of the world. For example, we probably would have to resort to rigid regimentation and to stultify personal liberties and free enterprise. In the process of preparing for and conducting another global war, we might permanently destroy the bulwarks of our democracy.

There is a relatively new factor in the formulation of United States foreign policy which is of increasing importance. This is the requirement for consultation and collaboration with friendly governments and peoples in the accomplishment of mutual objectives. Formerly, such




consultation and collaboration were the exception, and this is understandable. As we advance technologically, we are increasingly dependent upon other countries or areas of the world for certain important raw materials. Further, because science has shrivelled the world, we no longer have *time* and *space* serving as guardians of our homeland. New ultra-destructive weapons may span swiftly the vast water areas that have served in the past as barriers. Strained relations may be so long drawn out as no longer to constitute a timely warning. Allies may be unable to hold off enemy thrusts while we create the means required for the conduct of military operations. Therefore, as the United States abandons the last vestiges of her isolationist policy and participates realistically in world affairs, collaboration with friendly nations and peoples in the discharge of international responsibilities becomes more and more essential. We should take the initiative and assume the leadership in this collaboration.

Our announced national and international objectives at the time we entered World War I, couched in such alluring phrases as, "The war to end all wars" and "The war to make the world safe for democracy," were neither realistic nor clear-cut. We neglected to achieve agreement with Allies, at any time, concerning the political, economic and psychological conditions which we might have hoped to create in Europe after defeating Germany and her satellites. The military defeat of Germany was, at best, only an empty victory. Empty, because of our failure to achieve the political, economic and psychological objectives, which might have established conditions for a permanent peace. Empty, because a situation was permitted to develop in Europe that led to the acquisition of power by another German leader, more aggressive and arrogant than the Kaiser.

■ DURING the period between World Wars I and II, United States foreign policy returned to isolationism. The American people were apathetic towards events transpiring abroad. We did not join the League of Nations, nor were we especially concerned in maintaining the political and economic stability of central Europe in order to fore-stall dictatorships and aggression.

Gradually events indicated clearly the inevitability of American participation in World War II. When these events crystallized at Pearl Harbor, we found ourselves somewhat better prepared, militarily at least, than at the time of our entry into World War I. There had been some preliminary military planning with British and Canadian staffs. The munitions industry had stepped up its productive capacity progressively in order to supply the British and their allies. We had thus taken important initial steps toward converting from a peace to a wartime economy. Finally, there were available more and better trained naval and air units, and there was the nucleus of a small army.



Except for the glittering generalities of the Atlantic Charter and occasional vague pronouncements by leaders of the Allied Nations, neither we nor our Allies, during World War II, enunciated realistic common objectives for rebuilding a sound world order. Failure to formulate and to declare our national aims in the political, economic and cultural fields, with the widespread uncertainty and doubt engendered by that failure, is responsible for much of the world's suffering today. We must abandon, once and for all, the old habit of offering pious platitudes in the field of diplomacy. We must place our national aims before the bar of world opinion. We must explain clearly the principles for which we are prepared to make any sacrifice.

In World War II as in the first World War, there was a dearth of accurate and comprehensive information, not only concerning our enemies but also our allies, particularly Russia. Even Germany underestimated Russian capabilities and paid a high price. The Russians exploited our lack of information to the fullest, repeatedly threatening to make a separate peace with Germany, and constantly pressing the Allies with extravagant demands.

Practically everything concerning World War II strategy was based on purely military considerations to bring about early, crushing military victory. In the absence of definitive Anglo-American postwar political and economic objectives, our military leaders had no alternative but to plan for the military defeat of Germany and Japan, regardless of the dislocations and devastation incident thereto.

■ THE WESTERN Allies apparently failed to realize sufficiently early the extent of the political and economic chaos that would be generated in Europe and the Far East by the war. They did not grasp the fact that our policies, plans, and actions would create vacua into which flow, irresistibly, such new ideologies as were most readily available. Soviet Russia recognized this in 1944—perhaps even earlier—and quickly took advantage of her dominant position to extend frontiers and to spread her influence throughout war-weary Europe and the Far East. Our Government unquestionably lost hard-earned opportunities to supplant the Nazi system by one based on western democratic ideas of constitutional government. A complete plan for rehabilitation and territorial adjustments should have been provided to insure political and economic developments throughout Europe in consonance

with our national interests. This plan should have been proposed, and agreement with our Allies reached, at the time of our entrance into the war, or shortly thereafter, when we were lend-leasing billions of dollars worth of supplies to Soviet Russia and other Allies, and when we possessed the greatest military power, particularly in the air and on the sea.

It should have been recognized that it would be of utmost importance for political and postwar considerations to have Anglo-American forces on the Continent — in France, Germany, Poland and the Balkans, occupying and controlling as much of these areas as practicable at the war's end. The ideology of Soviet Russia with a totalitarian political structure, a regimented economy, and the abnegation of individual liberties were and are abhorrent to the American people. In retrospect, it is clear that our national strategy should have been oriented toward denying to the Soviet Union the opportunities—which she embraced so promptly and effectively—to make direct contacts with defeated peoples susceptible to the Soviet ideology. There is evidence that the political implications of developments in Europe were foreseen to some

degree by certain Anglo-American leaders, but no appropriate action was taken.

Our national strategy was ineffective because it was incomplete. We failed to relate or to integrate the military factor in strategy with the political, economic, and psychological. Military victory was achieved, but today we find that the national aims for which we fought are jeopardized by the very conditions of that victory. We liberated most of Europe and Asia from one totalitarian system only to let the people of those areas fall under the aegis of another.

It is clear that our national strategy must provide for the timely and coordinated employment in peace or in war of all available resources in order to insure that political, economic and psychological conditions are created everywhere in consonance with our national aims. Concomitantly, we must be alert to the impact of our national strategic plans and their implementation upon our own political, economic, and social structure.

In the world today it is recognized that there are two strongly divergent groups of peoples or nations, creating very difficult, sometimes tense situations. The Soviet

"... because science has shriveled the world we no longer have



Union and her satellites comprise one group, the United States and her adherents comprise the other. A state of moral belligerency exists, manifested in many different ways. In a political, economic, and psychological sense, these two groups are actually in conflict with each other.

1950

"... means of our homeland . . ."

Only a short time ago it was believed that there would be no major war for a long period of time. The United States and the Soviet Union were viewed and opposed.

The Soviet Union has pursued certain objectives in various areas of the world under the guise of providing "security" for herself and satellites. Her immediate objective, already well along the way to attainment, is to establish a continuous belt of Soviet dominated nations along the Soviet perimeter, particularly where a truly independent nation might constitute a danger. The Soviet Union's current strategic policy—a policy which, so far, does not require the employment of armed force, except as a threat—will probably continue. When the allegedly "defensive" policy objectives have been reached in their entirety, or possibly even prior to their complete attainment, Soviet Russia may attempt to consolidate the entire Eurasian land mass and dominate the strategic approaches thereto. The next step might then be toward the attainment of the ultimate objective, so frequently expressed in

the writings and pronouncements of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, namely the domination of the world.

Nobody can state that this ultimate global objective will remain unchanged. There are many factors which could radically affect the Soviet Union's present attitude and alter her overall objectives in the international field. These include the emergence of new leaders who might be more tolerant of the western democracies and their ideals. A great spiritual resurgence of irresistible proportions among the Russian people is a distinct possibility. There may be drastic modifications in the political and economic structure of the Soviet government, impelled by international pressures or by new influences not clearly discernible today.

We should, of course, attempt to promote developments of this nature by all means possible. It is our expressed desire that international differences be resolved without the employment or intimidation of force. The United Nations Charter epitomizes American views in this regard. But until a realistic world organization with appropriate



Responsibilities of an occupying nation are many and varied. German customs inspectors are closely supervised at Rhine Main Airport, Frankfort, Germany.

security forces becomes effective, we have an inescapable responsibility to insure that our country is prepared, and is actually taking the necessary steps to forestall aggressions or to preclude developments that militate against our objectives or jeopardize peace in the world.

Indications are that the Soviet Union will avoid a "shooting war" for several years. She is not prepared for a major war. Further, why should Russia resort to the employment of military force when she is enjoying marked success in the accomplishment of her program of expansion and penetration through other means? It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets will continue the current political-economic-psychological "cold war," with the frequent changes of pace and the maximum employment of surprise which have become familiar to us.

There is no single document which lists all of our national policies or specifically defines national objectives. Recent pronouncements by the President and other responsible government officials provide some broad bases upon which to work. The Charter of the United Nations Organization also provides the strategic planner with further policy guidance.

During the past year economic and to a lesser degree political, psychological, and military steps have been taken in Western Europe. The United States has transferred five billion dollars worth of raw and processed materials to the 16 nations participating in the European Recovery Plan. Political alliances are assuming definitive form and meaning, for example the Western Union defense pact

and the Atlantic Pact. But elsewhere our attitude has been to surrender the initiative to the Soviets, to wait and watch developments, then to improvise or conjure up some counter-measures. It is noteworthy that the Communists have had to seek methods of countering our steps in Western Europe the last few years, by desperate moves such as the Czech coup d'état, the blockade of Berlin, and the waves of French strikes.

We are engaged in psychological operations, but so far on a pitifully inadequate scale. For many years, the Soviets have been conducting an intensive and effective propaganda campaign directed primarily against the United States. Their objective is to weaken and divide world opinion to such a degree that effective opposition to the spread of the Communist ideology is impossible. Our efforts to counter this propaganda campaign have so far been inept—almost negligible. The extent, the true motives, and even the existence, of our aid programs, have often been unknown to the recipients of American cooperation. Obviously, it is imperative that we develop, strengthen, coordinate, and implement all possible information means, susceptible of influencing attitudes, policies, plans, and actions in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of our objectives. Without a concurrent comprehensive psychological program our political and economic recovery measures can never achieve full effectiveness.

• IN ADDITION to the steps suggested above, the existence and proper deployment of armed forces play a definite part in the attainment of objectives without recourse to a "shooting war." Much of the effectiveness of political, economic, and psychological measures is lost if there is no suggestion whatsoever of military force to back them up. Even the limited military occupation forces in Germany and Austria present a deterrent to Communist penetration. The effectiveness of these forces cannot be measured solely by their military strength, for they constitute a political and particularly a psychological power factor, which is far in excess of their actual numbers. Their presence also limits Soviet freedom of action by restricting Communist covert operations.

The most immediate and pressing problem is to stop Soviet expansion. Admittedly this is a difficult task, but not an impossible one. If stability and a modicum of peace in the world is to be accomplished, we must answer the challenge of Communism. A purely defensive strategy or isolationism will not alleviate the situation. American dollars, raw and processed materials, atom bombs and strategic air force, none of these will suffice, so long as the Soviet Russians maintain the initiative in the psychological field. They promise the masses bounties and these promises have irresistible appeal to hungry, war weary, bewildered people. The fact that they have neither the intention nor the ability to fulfill such promises is not



The 52-truck convoy which brought food and supplies to Berlin last July on the autobahn en route from Berlin to Wetzlar.

understood by the unsuspecting masses, who are intimidated by various sinister means, or who are deceived by lies, and hood-winked by promises of power and wealth. It is difficult to understand why people are so gullible and naive.

The Soviet Union and her satellites are implementing steps that confute, strongly militate against, and in some instances definitely block our attempts to accomplish current American policies.

There are certain steps that the United States must take to facilitate accomplishment of our national policies. First, we must provide and maintain adequate and appropriate military means for realistic and proportionate United States participation in the common defense. We must maintain an adequate military base system in strategic locations throughout the world and complete the common defense structure of the Western Hemisphere. We must maintain an effective world-wide strategic intelligence system. We must continue United States economic, moral, and military aid to friendly peoples whose freedom is endangered by Soviet or satellite pressures. We must insure that we retain our technological superiority through the expansion of research and development activities and by scrupulously restricting information concerning development, employment and stockpiling of ultra-destructive weapons and their component parts. We must continue support of the United Nations in the attainment of its lofty aims accepting the possible development that certain other nations may not actively participate. Finally, we must reach the hearts and minds of our own and other

peoples of the world, through every available medium, to insure that they understand and appreciate the peaceful objectives of the western democracies, as well as the implications of the Soviet totalitarian political and economic structure and aims.

In preparing for a *next war* the military leaders are often guilty of basing preparations, such as weapons, tactics and techniques, upon the lessons or experiences of the *last war*, instead of projecting their minds forward and conjuring up the conditions that might reasonably be expected to confront them in a *future war*. Those who are responsible for our national strategy might be guilty of the same error and therefore should carefully avoid strategic plans that are based entirely on lessons or experiences of past history—essentially of the last 50 years. Equilibrium in an atomic world cannot be purchased cheaply and the continuation of western civilization cannot be guaranteed except by American strategy that includes *creative thinking; realistic and imaginative planning; and dynamic action*.

The world has undergone kaleidoscopic changes during the past century due to the *force of ideas* and the *convictions of men*. Communism will enjoy success everywhere, even in our own citadel of free men unless and until it is clearly confronted by our stronger “faith” and broader “vision.” Either we Americans, and all peoples friendly to us, believe in our own destiny and selflessly and vigilantly support our principles or we must yield ignominiously to people of stronger belief and of greater faith.

USMC

Decisive Amphibious

DE NAVIBVS - ETHI



Shore Party? Force Beachhead Line? Prefabricated materiel? Clean-shaven troops? Close haircuts? These items sound as though they belong on the checklist of a modern landing force commander. But the year was 1066.

R

Battles III: Hastings

Why Decisive?

THE BATTLE OF HASTINGS BROUGHT NEW STRENGTH, new ideas, to England. It blended the best of Saxon and Norman qualities. As Toynbee might have said, "The stimulus provided by the Norman invasion made the mighty British Empire possible 700 years later."

Background

CREASY's *Decisive Battles of the World* lists, after Syracuse (413 BC) : Arbela (331 BC, where Alexander crushed the Persian Empire), The Metaurus (207 BC, where Rome crushed Carthage), Arminius' Defeat of the Roman Legions (9 AD, when the German tribes turned back the Romans), Chalons (451, where the Romans defeated Attila, and turned back the Huns), and Tours (732, where Charles Martel defeated the Saracens).

These battles since Syracuse have not been reviewed here, as they could not really qualify as amphibious battles, so now we are brought to the Battle of Hastings, the next decisive battle listed by Creasy.

Before 1066, England had been overrun many times by invaders. In fact, so many successful invasions are known to have occurred, that there is some doubt as to who the original inhabitants may have been. In 1017, King Canute of Denmark became King of England also, and until the death of his last son, in 1041, England was ruled by the Danes. In 1041, the Saxon line was restored and ruled until Harold was defeated at Hastings. Normandy, the home of the invaders, was itself the subject of invasion many years earlier. In 832, the Danes, or Northmen, had already established themselves in the northern portion of France, and in 911, the King of France ceded the northern province to Hrolf the Northman. Thereafter, the province was known as Normandy, or the province of the Northmen. A ruling class of Normans, quick, intelligent, and progressive, gradually came into being. But they were also cruel, and lacked the innate honesty and humility of the Saxons.

The Norman invasion was precipitated by Harold's refusal to marry into the Norman nobility, and his refusal to honor the oath of allegiance to the Norman duke, which he had made under duress while captive in Normandy. The real cause of the dispute was Duke William of Normandy's ambition to become King of England.

The Normans Mold Public Opinion

DUKE WILLIAM first sent an ultimatum to King Harold, demanding that he honor his covenant and relinquish

the throne to the Norman. When Harold refused, William put into operation the first part of his plan. He wrote to the Pope, presenting his case. The Pope found in his favor, and called on all loyal Catholics to support the cause of the Normans. A special battle flag was sent to the gathering army. The most adventurous warriors of the day came to offer their arms, and a large army began to form.

Task Force Sussex

THE DUKE began the construction of his fleet in the spring of 1066, and by early summer all the principal seaports of Normandy, Picardy, and Brittany were busily employed in building the invasion ships.


The Attack Force assembled at the staging area, near the mouth of the Dive, which is a little river between the Seine and the Orne, in August, 1066. The army was considered by contemporaries to have been the finest, largest, and best equipped heretofore assembled by any Western power. It was made up of volunteers from nearly all the Christian countries, formed about a hard nucleus of Norman knights, the elite troops of the day. There were about 50,000 knights, most of whom were to fight dismounted, as there were insufficient ships suitably equipped for landing the horses. In addition, there were about 10,000 infantry, archers, engineers, and service troops. The task force included a large number of sailors, not all of whom were Normans, and it should be noted that the ships' companies included carpenters' mates, sailmakers, and other similar ratings.

The landing ships designated to carry the warhorses were equipped with tackle for landing the "warhorses and palfreys" as well as other heavy gear such as the knights' shields, and fortification materials.

There is evidence that William had one of the most efficient organizations yet seen. There was a shore party,

By Major Niels M. Dahl, Inf USA

In his search for illustrations for this article our staff artist turned to the imagination of a local painter. The result is a picture of a scene that probably never occurred, but which is typical of the artistic beauty of the old country.





made up of "squires, sergeants, and sailors," and they were rehearsed in their duties while in the staging area. It appears that the shore party employed the "slot system," and that the ship's platoon which unloaded the ship was under the same command as the shore party. The best proof of the extent of planning, particularly logistical, was the preparation of the first three "prefabs" this writer has found recorded in history. In this case, the prefabs consisted of three wooden castles which were to be erected on the far shore, principally to protect the supply dump which was to be established on Beach Blue, at Pevensey Bay. Barrels of dowels, cut to the proper diameter and length, were part of the equipment, and engineers were equipped with large axes, mauls, and other equipment to assist in the erection of the castles. They were even provided with a special harness to carry their tools ashore with them. In addition to carrying a great quantity of supplies, a portion of the mounted troops were designated to act as foragers, once the landing had been effected, and the situation permitted.

All troops were required to have their hair cut short, and their beards shaved. All soldiers were dressed in short garments to facilitate quick movement and maneuver. These innovations also resulted in an appearance of uniformity seldom achieved in 11th century armies.

The Norman Plan

THE MOST careful plans were made for deployment, once the Landing Force was landed. Until now, most such operations were governed by an operation order which might have read: "Land when his lordship gives the signal, debark as best you can, and kill his lordship's foes."

William, an early practitioner of unification, personally commanded the Task Force, the Attack Force, and the Landing Force, and he planned the forthcoming operation for all three in considerable detail. Archers were to land first, with bows strung, quivers full, and a few arrows at the ready. They were to advance quickly, moving inland to establish a beachhead. Then part of the shore party was to land, secure the ships, and assist the knights to debark. Next, the knights were to land in full armor, receive their shields from the shore party, and reinforce the archers. The mounts for the knights were to be landed next, followed by those knights who were to be mounted. Finally the remainder of the shore party, consisting of carpenters and laborers, was to be landed. The latter were to help unload the prefab castles, and as soon as the first

one was erected ashore the supplies were to be landed. This provision of, and planning for, a shore party is in marked contrast to the earlier operations we have critiqued, and undoubtedly had a great effect on the outcome of the battle. The troops designated as foragers were to scour the countryside for supplies and clothing which might be useful later to the command. Cossack posts were to be established at a distance from the beach-head to warn of the approach of hostile forces. And so the Normans planned and rehearsed.

Harald Hardrada Attacks First

FATE SEEMED to conspire against Harold, the Saxon king, from the first. While William was planning and rehearsing the Norman invasion, poor Harold was busy trying to repel another invasion in the north. Harald Hardrada, King of Norway, sailed to the Orkneys in the spring of 1066 with 200 warships and 300 PAs and KAs. Here, many of the islanders joined his banner and sailed with him to Yorkshire. Near the city of York, Harald fought and defeated the Saxon governor of Northumbria, Earl Edwin and Earl Morcar. The city of York and all the north of England, from the Tyne to the Humber, surrendered to the Norwegians. Harold the Saxon, trying to prepare for the expected attack of the Normans from the south, had to drop his preparations and rush to the north to repel those unexpected invaders. Surprising the invaders near Stamford Bridge, Harold fought, and finally won, a terrible battle. Although Harald Hardrada and the best of his force was killed, and Norway was forced to assume the defensive for the next 25 years, Harold the Saxon lost some of his best men, and far worse, was prevented from interfering with the landing of William. It is most unlikely that William was aware of the landing of Harald Hardrada, but the effect was as though these two operations had been perfectly coordinated and executed.

The Landing

WHEN Task Force Sussex was ready to sail, the winds turned unfavorable and William found himself in that most unpleasant situation of having his force at the point of embarkation without being able to embark. The men were worked up to a high pitch of enthusiasm at the advent of the invasion, but now the "let-down" began. Duke William, like uncounted commanders since, set about restoring morale and increasing efficiency by rehearsals, drills, and tightening of discipline. Undoubtedly the success of the Normans is at least partially attributable to their excellent training and discipline. Finally the wind changed, and Task Force Sussex sailed, from the shore of the Dive, only to be driven along the French coast to St. Valery, where most of the ships took shelter.

However, many were wrecked, and it is said that the shores were littered with the dead. This setback, however, proved to be of great advantage to the Normans in two ways. First, it prevented them from landing until after Harold the Saxon fought and won his costly victory, and second, it delayed the landing until after the English fleet had to retire from its patrol of the channel in order to re-victual.

Finally the task force sailed again, led by the flagship *Mora*, which boasted a figurehead of brass representing a child with a drawn bow, the arrow pointed at England. The crossing was effected without incident, and the unopposed landing was made on the Sussex shore, between Hastings and Pevensey. The ships grounded in good order, and the plan was put into effect. First the archers sprang ashore and established a beachhead, then the shore party landed. It appears that the beach party and the shore party were combined, as no mention can be found of a separate beach party. Anchors were carried ashore to secure the ships while the unloading took place. The armored, but unmounted, knights landed, received their shields from the shore party, and moved inland to reinforce the archers. The first horses ashore were ridden by knights detailed to cossack post duties. They galloped off to their posts as soon as landed. Then the main mounted force received their horses, and the whole armed force was ashore. Before any other activities were begun, the first of the three prefab castles were erected. The pieces even had been bored to receive the wooden pins provided to hold them together. The barrels of dowels were landed, and all the carpenters had to do was hold the pieces in place and drive the dowels. Then the supplies were landed, and placed in the protection of the wooden castle. When this work was completed, just before dark of D-Day, all hands "knocked off ships work," and ate their evening meal. Up to this time, the only Englishmen the Normans had encountered were a few frightened yeomen whom the outposts had seen running away.

The Defense Plan

HAIRD's plan of defense consisted of rushing toward William as fast as possible, and defeating him by direct assault as quickly as possible. Some of his leaders suggested that the Saxons advance to the Norman outpost line, then retreat before them until they reached a good defensive line, meanwhile burning and destroying everything behind them, thereby preventing William's forces from living off the land. Harold is reported to have refused, on the grounds that this would only bring greater misery and suffering to the peasants. This reasoning, while noble, is reminiscent of the argument against use of the atom bomb. Those supplies, which Harold failed to destroy, were taken and used by William, causing the peasants not only the misery of want but the added misery of virtual slavery.

Having defeated the Norwegians, Harold was celebrating his victory at York when he heard the news that William had landed at Sussex. Taking the remnants of his army, Harold rushed to London, where he was acclaimed by his people. He allowed his force to rest at London for six days, meanwhile sending for reinforcements from the southern and midland countries. Confident of success, Harold moved out before most of the replacements arrived and he moved south to intercept the Normans with hardly more than the survivors of the battle at Stamford. At the same time, he gave orders for the English fleet to assemble off Sussex, and if possible, to attack the Norman fleet. The Saxon force then moved through Surrey and Sussex toward the Norman beachhead.

The Normans Move to Hastings

ON THE MORNING of D-plus-One, the Normans moved out of their beachhead toward Hastings. At the same time, William sent strong cavalry reconnaissance patrols in several directions, determined not to be surprised by Harold. One or more of these patrols made contact with Harold's troops, advancing rapidly southward from London. The Norman cavalry maintained contact, falling back before the advancing Saxons without offering combat—another evidence of good discipline. The main body of the Normans having reached Hastings, the two castles remaining were erected, and the Normans constructed a fortified camp about them. Foraging parties were sent out to round up any supplies which could be taken from the countryside. Many fleeing Saxons were stopped, and relieved of their cattle or other valuables—(probably of their lives as well).

Harold had hoped to surprise the Normans by his very fast march, but when he saw the Norman cavalry he knew that this hope was futile. He stopped about seven miles short of the Hastings fortifications, and sent French-speaking spies into the Norman camp. They reported back to him that the Norman's force must consist principally of priests, as there were so many men with short hair, close shaves, and short tunics. Harold, familiar with the Norman customs, was not fooled, but it is likely that many of his men, accustomed to the long beards of the Saxons, believed until the day they died that they had fought priests. Harold decided to fortify his position, and await the onslaught of the Normans. He selected a position on a hill, known until that time as Senlac Hill. There was a woods at his back, and two low hills before him. In the plain between Senlac Hill and the two low hills was a fosse, which was to play an important part in the coming battle. Harold had his men erect a wall, or fence, of poles, wattes, dirt, shields, anything at hand, and instructed them to defend from behind this fortification. Harold had to solve the same problem that Miltiades had to solve at Marathon—how to defend against an enemy superior in

cavalry. Harold solved the problem by choice of terrain and organization of his defense forces. He determined the most likely objective for a cavalry charge, and defended it accordingly. The choice of Senlac Hill for a defensive position was excellent for two reasons: First, it lay astride the route to London, and though it could be bypassed, any force so doing would lay itself open to a flank attack. Second, Senlac Hill offered the best possible position for defense against a cavalry charge.

The day before the battle, William moved his force in three divisions to the hills facing Senlac Hill. Here he stopped, and once more sent emissaries to Harold, first offering Harold three choices: (1) Abdicate in favor of William, and avoid the battle. (2) Refer the matter to the Pope for arbitration. (3) Settle the dispute by single combat—a duel—with William. Harold refused all three. Then William tried again, this time he offered to give




Harold and his brother all of England north of the Humber, and some other lands, if Harold would abdicate in his favor. This time he threatened the Saxons with excommunication if they refused, and showed them a papal bull he had obtained to back him up. Although Harold and his men were visibly shaken at the threat of excommunication, Harold refused again. When the emissary returned this time, William announced that the next day, Saturday the 14th of October, would be the day of battle.

The Battle

ON THE MORNING of D-plus-15, the battle began. Duke William took position on one of his hills, whence he could observe the whole battle. He stretched his three divisions along the while length of Harold's defensive line. Then the Normans attacked, their cavalry thrusting



at the very point Harold had predicted. This attack was repelled, and the English counterattacked, driving many of the Norman knights into the fosse, where they were hopelessly tangled. It was at this point that the Normans sustained their most considerable losses of the day. From nine o'clock in the morning until early afternoon the two masses of troops surged up and down the hill, with the advantage, if any, in the hands of the English. In fact, some of the Normans started to flee, having decided that the battle was lost to them. William now called off his forces, reorganized and gave them new orders. First of all, he had noticed that the English were suffering very few casualties from the Norman arrows, as the Saxons kept behind their shields, and the arrows were harmlessly deflected. Therefore, William instructed his archers to shoot their arrows high into the air, so that they might fall like mortar shells. When the English saw the Norman



arrows rising high they inadvertently turned their faces up to watch them, and even Harold made this mistake. It is recorded that Harold was struck in the eye by one of the arrows, and wrenched it out and broke it himself. However, this wound so weakened him that he was unable to continue in active command of his forces. Meanwhile William had ordered his left flank division to attack the Saxons once more, and to pretend to retreat from the expected counter-attack. Then the center division was to swing to its left, and take the counter-attacking Saxons in the flank. This scheme was very effective, as Saxon discipline was not efficacious after the King was wounded, and he had no second-in-command to enforce his orders. Harold had given orders for them to defend from behind their barriers, but this seemed too good a chance to avenge their wounded king. The Norman maneuver was highly successful, resulting in the destruction of the

experienced before by the inhabitants. Under the Saxon and preceding Norse Kings, the people had felt themselves to be the *supporters* of their liege lord. Now, under the Norman King, they were considered *subjects*, and were treated by the Norman lords as an inferior race. The Normans, on the other hand, were obliged to establish a more efficiently organized government than any nation had yet seen, in order to maintain their superiority and to hold the resentful Saxons in the place. After a few generations, it could be seen that the two races were blending into a new people, superior in most respects to either of its forebears.

The Moral

• WHAT IS to be learned from this successful amphibious attack of nearly 900 years ago?

1. Amphibious Planning Must Include a Logistical Plan



Saxon right flank, with very light casualties to the Normans. It was the turning point of the battle. The entire Norman force now concentrated on the Saxon center, where Harold had taken station, and soon the Saxon King was killed. Once the English troops understood that their king was dead, they lost heart, and fought a losing battle. The Normans pursued the retreating troops to the woods, and sporadic fights continued until nearly dark.

The Box Score

• THERE ARE NO records of the number of men lost by the Saxons, but the survivors were dispersed, and the effectiveness of the Saxon army was destroyed forever. The Normans are believed to have lost about 15,000 men, but they gained a Kingdom, for Duke William was crowned King of England shortly after the battle. There was now a new feeling in England, one foreign to any

to Support the Tactical Plan.

William knew and practiced this precept, contributing greatly to the confidence and success of his troops.

2. Never Underestimate an Enemy.

Harold, flushed with success after his victory over Harald Hardrada, seems to have rushed headlong into battle with William, not waiting for the reinforcements he had levied.

3. Sentiment Must not be Permitted to Obscure Judgment.

Harold, in a misguided effort to save the people of Sussex, lost the whole Kingdom.

4. Leaders Must Delegate Authority to Subordinates.


Once Harold was wounded, unable to personally direct his forces, discipline broke down. There was none to prevent the fatal counter-attack launched by the Saxon right flank.

USMC

In Brief

Plans have been completed for the third annual convention of the First Marine Division Association to be held in Washington over the weekend of August 4, 5, and 6. Headquarters will be at Hotel Statler. All members of the wartime First Marine Division and units operationally attached are eligible to attend. For those reserving in advance, registration fee has been set at \$2.00. Reservations are being accepted by the Reunion Treasurer, LtCol George F. Gober, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C. Special events will include reunions of sub-units, parade, a moonlight cruise on the Potomac with dancing, a cocktail party, banquet, and sightseeing tours of Washington and vicinity.

The new Martin KDM-1 pilotless target drones will be used to test the latest fire control systems of the U. S. Navy's big guns. The KDM-1 is taken aloft by a mother airplane and its ramjet engine started. The plane is then released from the mother aircraft and controlled from afar entirely by radio while being watched on a radar screen. Controls may be pre-set before launching, but these may be overridden by radio at the discretion of the distant control officer.



The Navy has modified its aircraft marking specifications to authorize painting the word "Navy" or "Marines" in large letters on both sides of the fuselage and on the under surface of the left wings of Navy or Marine Corps planes. The modification also permits Navy and Marine Corps planes to be marked on the under surface of the right wing with the name of the air station or squadron to which they are attached. The new markings, which will be white on blue aircraft and black on aluminum-colored planes, were authorized to facilitate identification of Navy and Marine Corps planes from the ground and at close range.


The Second Marine Division Association's first annual convention will meet in Washington, D. C. from 11 to 13 August, with headquarters at the Mayflower Hotel. In addition to regular convention sessions, there will be sightseeing trips, boat excursions, entertainment at Marine Barracks, and many other features. Association members will receive by mail a program with complete details and registration cards for hotel accommodations. Former members who served with the Division at any time during the war or during occupation duty in Japan are eligible to join the association. For further details, write to: Secretary, Second Marine Division Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

The Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association held its first post-war national convention in Washington, D. C. recently. Delegates representing all sections of the country attended. Col Melvin J. Maas was re-elected national president in the final business session.

Tests of large-scale ramjet engines at simulated altitudes of 100,000 feet and at four times the speed of sound have begun in a newly completed test chamber at the Ordnance Aerophysics Laboratory at Daingerfield, Texas. The laboratory is operated for the Navy Bureau of Ordnance by Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation, under the technical direction of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. The new chamber makes possible for the first time high-altitude tests with full-scale ramjet engines as large as 48-inches in diameter. The ramjet which has been called the "flying stovepipe" is the type of engine used in propelling supersonic guided missiles. The cylindrical test chamber is 10 feet in diameter and 125 feet in length, with a 30-foot side door through which the ramjet engines are installed for tests.

Military pilots will make greater use of Civil Aeronautics Administration communication facilities under a plan developed jointly by the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce in the interest of efficiency and economy. Under the new plan the CAA will handle flight clearances and arrival and departure messages filed by military pilots from civil airports where the 417 CAA communications stations are located.

The range and power of the Navy's long-range antisubmarine patrol plane, the Lockheed P2V-4 *Neptune*, is being substantially increased by the installation of newly developed "compound" engines in current production models of the plane. The new engine, which replaces the conventional reciprocating power plant, is a combination of a reciprocating engine and three small gas turbines. Recent flight tests have shown that the compound engines will increase the non-refuelling range of the P2V-4 from 10 to 20 per cent, depending upon the payload carried. In addition, the new engine provides 20 per cent more power for full-load and carrier take-offs.



Personnel formerly stationed at Crane or Burns City, Indiana, will hold their Fifth Annual Reunion at Bloomington, Indiana, on 2, 3, and 4 September 1950. Personnel formerly stationed there are invited to attend. They will be entertained, dined, and shown the sights as well as the improvements made at their former station. Additional information can be secured from Crane Alumni President Clyde W. Taylor, 1000 South Walnut Street, Bloomington, Indiana.





all officers, especially the newly commissioned second lieutenants who are called upon to be recorder, defense counsel, or a member of a court-martial, will profit by the article, and that it will aid them in performing a very important part of the duties required of them by their acceptance of a commission in the naval service.

In order to visualize the situation more easily assume

RECODER

ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING AND RESPONSIBLE duties which you as a Marine officer can be assigned is that involving court martial duties, either as a prosecutor, defense counsel, or member. This duty can also be very frightening, especially if you are ordered to be a recorder or judge advocate and you have never been on a court, much less prosecuted one. This article is designed to aid in a small way those officers who are not lawyers, yet are called upon to act as such in the discharge of their duties. A recorder can find the court martial procedure and some legal rules in Naval Courts and Boards, but he won't find in that book any information on how to find the law on any particular point. This discussion will deal with how a recorder in a small organization goes about using the limited legal reference available to him in order to find some point of law.

Many of us in the naval service have learned about the material which this article will discuss through experience and the trial and error method. It is hoped that

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that you have been assigned as the recorder of a summary court-martial convened by your battalion commander. After receiving the specification preferred against the accused you give him his copy and inform him of his rights, as prescribed by Naval Courts and Boards. Then ask him that all important question, how is he going to plead, to which you get the answer you secretly have dreaded, "not guilty." Your long awaited problem is here, and your question is what to do about it?

First of all, you should get all the tools of your new trade that are available. In a battalion, or on board any sizable ship, you will probably find that there is a copy of Naval Courts and Boards, a complete set of Court Martial Orders, and maybe a 1916 Naval Digest. It is doubtful, but possible, that there is available also a textbook on criminal law or evidence, such as Clark and Marshall on crimes or Underhill's *Criminal Evidence*.

Many problems will immediately confront you, such as: Does the specification state an offense; what are the elements of the offense; which elements must be proved; what evidence can be introduced; etc. Some of these problems could possibly be presented in your case, and you must know the answers to them.

The first place to start is with "Old Faithful," Naval Courts and Boards. Becoming thoroughly familiar with Naval Courts and Boards, and in particular with the sections which pertain to your case, cannot be overemphasized. Don't be content to read one section you *think* is pertinent. Study the index and cross reference anything that might have a bearing on your problem. In reading the sections, digest the material, and be sure that you understand it.

If you can't understand what Naval Courts and Boards has to say about the subject, or if it doesn't cover the point enough to suit you, or if the material is ambiguous, the next place to look is in the Court Martial Orders. The orders are printed in various groups. The period covering the years 1916 to 1937 is compiled in a two-volume edition with a separate cumulative index. The orders from 1938 to 1949 are in monthly editions which can be bound together as yearly editions. A yearly index is available for each year from 1939 to 1948. From January 1949 to date, the orders are in monthly editions, and again, each as an index. The Naval Digest, 1916, is a digest of selected opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy given prior to 1916.

There are two ways to use the CMOs to find the point


the *latest* case on point is the *controlling* case, so you must now find out whether this point of law which you found in the compiled volume is still being followed or not. To help you do this, a table of court-martial citations is printed in the front of the cumulative index for the compiled volumes. In the left-hand column of this citation table is a list of cases that are cited in later cases. On the right-hand side, opposite each cited case, is a list of the *citing* cases. Small numbers appearing beside the page number of the cited cases indicate whether the case was "not followed," "modified," "overruled," "distinguished," or "reconsidered." If there is no small number indicating such action, it means that the case was merely cited, and you must then read the case to see whether the point of law you are interested in is referred to or not.

Since the citations in the cumulative index only go up to 1937, this method of research on this point is not yet complete. Following the index, in each subsequent yearly volume of the court martial orders, is a table of citations similar to the one in the compiled index, except that no indications are made to show whether the case has been followed or overruled. It is necessary, therefore, to study each citing case not only to determine

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of law desired. Since the most recent ruling on any point is controlling, you may want to start your search in the index of the latest yearly volume. As in Naval Courts and Boards, try every possible heading listed, in order to make sure that you have exhausted the subject. As an example, if you are attempting to find something about when the best evidence rule applies, look under "Best Evidence," "Evidence," and "Documentary Evidence." Or if your subject is how far you can go on the cross-examination of an accused while he is a witness, look under such subject headings as "Accused," "Testimony," "Witnesses," "Cross-examination," "Evidence," etc. If you don't find what you want, turn to the next preceding year, and so until you find the applicable precedent.

* THE OTHER WAY to find a court martial order on your particular question is to start with the index of the compiled volumes for the years 1916-1937. This index, because it covers many years of Court Martial Orders, will very naturally cite more cases on each particular subject. If you find your point of law in this compiled volume, you are not through looking. Remember that



courts follow the rule that such an admission is *presumed to be voluntary*, if no contention to the contrary is made by the accused at the trial. Regardless of which rule we like, we would follow the latter, the federal rule.

So far the discussion has been, generally, how to use the reference books. Let's take a few examples and see if you are able to find the present law governing certain hypothetical situations.

Assume that the specification you received as recorder alleged that the accused did " * * * wilfully, wrongfully, and without proper authority, attempt to destroy property of the United States, to wit, a radio in the recreation room of said barracks." One of your duties as recorder is to make sure that the specification states an offense. To do this you first check it with a sample specification in Naval Courts and Boards. The Naval Courts and Boards index under the subjects of "Attempting," "Destruction of property," and "Property, public," all refer to section 59, specification 4. Referring to that section you will see that your specification follows that sample, except that it doesn't say how the accused attempted to destroy the radio.

Looking back at the index again, under "Attempts," you will find the subtopic "What constitutes an attempt—section 43"; and, under "Charges and Specifications," the subtopics "Elements of—section 27," "Rules for drawing up—Section 26-27," and "Stating facts with certainty—Section 32." You should then read the sections mentioned, and in so doing, you will find that section 27 says, in paragraph 4: "It is not sufficient that the accused be charged generally with having committed an offense, but the particular acts or circumstances attending a specific offense must be distinctly set forth in the specification." And, in Section 32, Naval Courts and Boards uses the words above and adds, "All facts, circumstances, and intent must be set forth with certainty and precision * * *."

FROM what you have discovered so far it appears that the specification in question doesn't set forth distinctly the particular act which was done. However, to make sure that you understand these sections of the book you can check Court Martial Orders. Start with the 1948 volume and search both the index and the citation table. Under the subject of "Attempts" you find four cases referred to, while under "Charges and Specifications, defective," you find nothing on your question. Turn next to the citations and there you find on page 34 that Section 59, Naval Courts and Boards (the section containing the sample specification) has been cited in three cases.

You now have seven cases to examine, to see if your point happens to be covered in this volume of Court Martial Orders. Starting with the citation cases, the



first reference given to you is 1-34 (CMO 1, 1948, page 34). You find that this case touches upon the types of acts which will support the charge of Scandalous Conduct, and therefore it doesn't concern your present problem. The next citation given is 5-158 (CMO 5, 1948, page 158). When you read this case you find on page 159, in the second paragraph, the point of law you have been looking for. The specification alleged that the accused did " * * * attempt to break arrest and escape the aforesaid shore patrol." The Court Martial Order holds: " * * * the specification was defective in that it fails to set forth the particular acts and circumstances constituting the attempt (CMO 8, 1946, 284)."

You should now read the 1946 Court Martial Order cited to see whether it elaborates on the point, or is to be distinguished from this case in any way. On page 284 of CMO 8, 1946 you find that the specification alleged that the accused did "attempt to break his arrest * * *." This Court Martial Order says, in the first paragraph, "The use of the word 'attempt' without more, is insufficient (CMO's 85, 1920,12; 2,1940,144)." You certainly need go no further now, as you have clearly established that the specification is defective and must be changed. Further, you have published opinions of the Judge Advocate General to show the convening authority, in case he doesn't agree with you.

Lets take another hypothetical situation. Assume that the accused, a private, is alleged to have wilfully, maliciously, and without justifiable cause struck one J—, another private. You as the recorder, have introduced evidence during the trial to show that the accused, while in a local bar, called J— obscene names and that J— then viciously attacked the accused. The accused, to keep from being knocked down, retuned the blows and was successful in knocking J—down. J— got up and started to leave the building but the accused followed him and hit him a few more times before J— went out the door. The accused contends that he was only striking J— in self-defense. You, as the recorder, should inform the court as to the law on this problem of self-defense. To prepare this statement of law as part of your argument, you must *find the law involved*.

You know that self-defense *may* be a defense to the offense of striking another person, but the particular

question presenting itself here is *how far may the accused go in defending himself*. In finding the answer to the preceding hypothetical problem you started with the latest court martial order, so far practice start this search with the red, three-volume compilation of CMOs. In looking for this question, the probable headings to search under would be "Self-defense," "Striking," and "Assault and Battery." If you look under the first topic, self-defense, you will see four possible references, two under self-defense as to Assault and Battery, and two as a defense to Striking Another Person in the Navy. Under the topics "Striking" and "Assault and Battery," you will find the same four court martial orders cited. You then look at these four cases and find that they all deal with just a charge of striking or assaulting, and thus do not touch on our question—that is, how far may one go in defending himself.

Naval digest, under the same topic headings, tell you nothing except under the section on self-defense; it says to refer to "Manslaughter 12," and "Murder 32." Looking under the 12th section of Manslaughter you find on page 356 in the third paragraph from the bottom of the page, the following: "But care must be taken that the resistance does not exceed the bounds of mere defense and prevention, for then the defender would himself become the aggressor." This answers your question, but this definition is given in a decision referring to manslaughter, so you should continue your search to see if you can find the same reasoning applied to a mere striking.

Go now to the yearly volumes again and, as before, start with the latest. Under the familiar topic headings there apparently is nothing in the monthly editions of 1949. In the 1948 volume you find nothing under the topic headings, but section 61 Naval Courts and Boards (Striking Another in the Navy) is cited in the citation table. However, upon looking at the case you find that your point is not discussed. In the 1947 volume you find nothing in the index, but section 61 is cited again. Upon checking you find that this case discussed the problem of how to plead the charge of striking—another blank, but don't give up.

In the 1945 volume, section 61 is cited, but again it deals with the subject of pleadings. However, the topic headings refer you to 6-277 (CMO 6, 1945, page 277).



Here you find that it was held that the accused, charged with striking another person in the navy, was acting in self-defense. The Court Martial Order said, "The two or more blows which the accused struck after the first blow, were delivered immediately, in the heat of the fight, and were all part of one scuffle. * * *. It could not be said that these additional blows were so clearly excessive as to be vindictive." This case seems to imply what you want—that is, that the defense can be no more than is necessary under the circumstances. However, there might be a better case so you should continue to search for it.


In the 1944 volume of Court Martial Orders, the topic heading, "Self defense," refers you to 1-153 (CMO 1, 1944, 153), and here, at last, is the very case you have been looking for. The Court Martial Order says, "If the accused used force against his assailant that was clearly excessive and all out of proportion to the attack, he himself would be guilty of assault and battery." This is the statement of the law that you will want to include in your argument, because it will support your contention that when the accused followed J—to the door *after* the fight and continued to hit him, he was striking without justifiable cause. Before leaving the Court Martial Orders you should check the citation table in the 1945, 1946, 1947, and 1948 volumes to see if this case has been cited. After a check you see that it hasn't been cited, so you can safely say this is the latest CMO on your point and thus should be controlling.

IN ADDITION to those references already mentioned, there is another reference which is probably available to battalions and above. This is the monthly publication put out by the Judge Advocate General's office, the JAG Journal. In February, 1949, the Journal announced that articles appearing in the JAG Journal may be cited, not as official legal determinations, but rather as accurate statements of the law which have been verified and checked to determine their validity as such. The Journal has recently published an up-to-date index which makes it very easy to find points of law which have been discussed. Many of the common problems which arise in courts martial every day are discussed in the Journal, and it is suggested that you consult this publication as you would your Naval Courts and Boards when preparing to try or defend an involved case.

Whenever you are going to prosecute or defend a case before a naval court martial, try to predict all the questions of law which will come before the court. After determining these questions, use your reference books in the manner we have discussed in order to get the latest ruling on each question. You can then go into the courtroom with the feeling that you are fully prepared to argue your case and collateral questions with confidence, knowing that you have your CMOs to cite in support of your contentions.

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GUERRILLA



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Napoleonic times indicates clearly that

tions can make a decisive contribution to the outcome of a war. Partisans have not won wars in the past, but will they win them in the future. But their activities can be of a magnitude and intensity sufficient to prevent one side or the other from winning.

Guerrillas are a feature common to all ideological wars. Their operations have been a significant aspect of such struggles since the days of our Revolution, and should there be a third great war they will inevitably be of the greatest importance. In a future war in which ideological issues are clearly drawn guerrilla activities will be dispersed over vast areas and will draw sustenance from all levels of populations. The quality of operations will be significantly improved over the past; modern weapons and equipment will make the guerrilla of the future a formidable antagonist in the type of warfare that he will conduct.

For these reasons the history of guerrilla experience can not be ignored. It was the guerrillas of Spain and Russia quite as much as the generalship of Wellington and Kutuzov that brought Napoleon to St Helena. This was not appreciated in 1815; it may not be fully appreciated in 1950. Nevertheless, it is true, and it counsels us to more fully acquaint ourselves with partisan theory and partisan action.

The assumption that guerrilla warfare cannot flourish as in the past is faulty. The structure of western industrial society provides a fertile field for partisan operations, and it is a safe assumption that guerrillas of the future will have ample opportunity for extremely effective work.

It is equally incorrect to assume that the airplane has limited either the scope or effectiveness of guerrilla activi-



ties. Guerrillas cannot be discovered by aerial cameras or observers and they do not concentrate to present profitable targets to bombardiers or aerial gunners. The airplane proved in the last war that it can be an important instrument for the support of guerrilla operations; it is of little if any use in directly combating them.

In a study of guerrilla war in history we find quite definite patterns constantly recurring. These recurring patterns are to be found on both sides of the cloth, so to speak. That is, they repeat themselves in terms of guerrilla theory and action, and in terms of the steps taken to counter such actions. One finds Mosby in Virginia, Lawrence in Arabia, and Mao Tze Tung in China, three "intellectual" guerrilla leaders, expressing identical tactical theories and putting them with consistent success to the test of action. On the other hand one discovers the French in Spain, Kitchener in South Africa, and the Japanese in North China attempting in turn to suppress guerrilla warfare by measures which were uniformly unsuccessful.

It is the purpose of this paper to describe some of the important partisan figures of history and to throw some light on their theories and methods in the hope that we may discern the constants that have been common to guerrilla warfare in the past and that may reasonably be expected to reappear in the future. In the process we will discover avoidable errors being repeated again and again at different times in history, in different places, by men who spoke different languages. It has been said that Bismarck once remarked: "Fools say they learn from experience; I prefer to learn from the experience of others."

None of those who have been called upon to conduct campaigns against partisans had apparently never heard this remark. In the Spanish Civil War in an earlier day there was some excuse for this lack of knowledge, for it makes one wonder the present

generation of military leaders who have been educated in the schools of the past.

It is not necessary to investigate the background of the Spanish Civil War except to point out that it was an ideological struggle carried on the most part by the Spanish people

and the foreign volunteers who came to help the Republicans. The Republicans were supported by the Soviet Union and the United States, while the Nationalists were supported by Germany and Italy. The Nationalists were able to win the war because they had better equipment and more money than the Republicans.

Guerrillas are a feature common to all ideological wars. The guerrilla of tomorrow will be a formidable antagonist, operating with time-tested techniques. To understand his capabilities, we must study his history

Here we see for the first time strategic and tactical co-ordination between conventional formations of both the army and the navy and organized guerrillas; we may trace the development of poorly equipped bands into well trained, highly mobile, hard striking combat groups, elusive and pervasive as mist. In their independent operations, the Spanish *guerrilleros* established the general pattern of partisan war with which we are familiar.

Frequently week after week passed with no communication between the Emperor in Paris, the higher headquarters of the French armies in Spain, and their columns operating in the field. Hundreds of couriers carrying official despatches were captured, foraging parties were ambushed and annihilated, and isolated garrisons were overwhelmed in surprise attacks. Supplies for the armies were intercepted, great sums of money were stolen from paymasters, traitors on whom the French relied for information were searched out and summarily executed. These activities produced in the French feelings of complete frustration, which in turn caused them to take punitive measures that were ill-considered and served only to intensify resistance. Heavy detachments were required to guard the vulnerable lines of communication, to hold the principal cities and to protect convoys with the result that forces available for the field were reduced in strength. Thus were a few able to immobilize many, to retain the initiative, to create consternation and to produce results out of all proportion to their numerical strength.

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Asturias, the province that was over a hundred years later to contribute the most hard-bitten fighting men in Spain to the Republican ranks. The Asturians proposed no half-way measures of resistance: They declared war on France. Other provinces followed, and by July the French had on their hands a full scale revolution, in which "Somatenes" (so called because the "Somaten," the alarm bell, roused them to arm) and "Miqueletes" (the "Minute Men")—the armed people who provided the nucleus for the guerrilla bands—played an important part. But in 1808 and 1809 partisan tactics were in their most elementary stage of development. According to Oman:

"The only Spanish fighters who were playing the proper game in 1809 were the Catalonian 'somatenes,' and even they gave battle far too often and did not adhere with sufficient pertinacity to the harassing tactics of guerrilla warfare."¹

A certain Faustino Fernandez who advocated

"The avoiding of battles, the harassing of the enemy's flanks and communications, and the employment of numerous flying bands."² was regarded as a visionary, and in 1809 few Spanish patriots paid him much attention. They were unable to see that Fernandez was attempting to introduce a new dimension to warfare.

The first of the great Spanish *guerrilleros* was Juan-Martin Diaz, nicknamed "El Empecinado," "The Obstinate One," who in the fall of 1809

"raised large bands during the absence of the normal garrisons and swept the countryside capturing convoys and cutting the lines of communication—The French governors on every side kept reporting their perilous position when they could get a message through to Madrid."³

¹ *A History of the Peninsular War* by Sir Charles Oman, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 35.

² *Ibid.*, p 35

³ *Ibid.*, p 83



A mild foretaste of what the future held in store for the French governors!

The Emperor bombarded his commanders with advice as to how to repress the guerrillas. His orders resulted "in much marching and countermarching of the newly arrived troops but to little practical effect in the way of repression for skilled leaders like Mina, the Empecinado and Julian Sanchez nearly always slipped between the fingers of their pursuers."⁴

In the fall of 1810 Mina the elder with his guerrilla bands was extremely active in Navarre. Although he never mustered over 4,000 men he kept six French generals busy:

"... his services were invaluable during the campaign of Portugal since he was wearing out a French force of five times his own strength, in fruitless marches, under winter rains, and over roads that had become all but impassable. The archives of the French war office show lists of officers by the dozen killed or wounded 'dans une reconnaissance en Navarre' or 'dans une recontre avec les bandes de Mina' . . . during the latter months of 1810 . . . Wellington owed him no small gratitude."⁵

Oman estimates that in 1810-11, there were never more than 20,000 guerrillas under arms between the Guadarrama Mountains (north of Madrid) and the Bay of Biscay. Yet he writes:

"despite their weakness in the open field . . . they rendered good services to Spain and incidentally to Great Britain and to all Europe by pinning down to the soil twice their numbers of good French troops. Anyone who had read the despatches of Napoleon's 'Military Governments' or the diaries of the officers who served in Reille's or Dorsenne's or Caffarelli's flying columns will recognize a remarkable likeness between the situation of affairs in Northern Spain during 1810 and 1811 and that in South Africa during 1900 and 1911. Lightly moving guerrilla bands unhampered by a base to defend or a train to weigh them down and well served as to intelligence by the residents of the countryside can paralyze the action of an infinitely larger number of regular troops."⁶

By JANUARY 1811, Napoleon (who had lost patience with generals unable to suppress the guerrillas in the north of Spain) named Marshal Bessières to command the "Army of the North" and gave him among other missions that of putting an end to the partisans. This proved to be a task quite beyond the means at the Marshal's disposal, and he reported to the Emperor that the guerrilla bands were daily increasing and that if he concentrated as much as a third of his 60,000 effectives to subdue them, all communications would be lost. He concluded this dispatch by pointing out that victory in Spain did not depend upon the outcome of a battle with the English, but rather upon the pacification of the country. His master, obsessed with the idea that a brilliant campaign culminating in a climactic battle would bring the war in the Peninsula to an end, was not interested in such reports. He considered Bessières a pessimist.⁷ As a matter of fact, the marshal was an optimist.

During the spring and early summer the *guerrilleros*

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol III pp 212-213

⁵ *Ibid.*, p 489

⁶ *Ibid.*, p 492

in the north were receiving arms and equipment from British cruisers operating in the Bay of Biscay and were steadily becoming stronger. The expedients the French adopted to control them were fruitless. Destruction of towns, taking of hostages, devastation of the countryside, execution of prisoners, construction of blockhouses—all were in vain. Occasionally a French flying column managed to catch a guerrilla group unaware and destroy or scatter it—if the latter the partisans soon reassembled none the worse for wear.

In June and July of 1811 northwestern Spain was "hotter" than it had ever been. Two famous *guerrilleros*, Longa and Porlier, in command of well organized and well equipped formations were operating in the Asturias and Leon with the result that the reports of Bessières were more pessimistic than usual.

"Countless expeditions against them had led to no final result. Like the holy men of old, when persecuted in one region they merely fled to another. If the flying columns and petty garrisons were withdrawn for a moment they would be at the gates of Burgos or Santander within two days and the . . . main arteries with France would be cut."⁸

At the end of July Bessières was relieved by Dorsenne.

The change in French commanders in northern Spain produced no change in the general situation, which steadily deteriorated.

"Longa and Porlier and Julian Sanchez—with the forces that were never very great in numbers, paralyzed by their ubiquity and their unceasing enterprise the greater part of Dorsenne's troops. If they had not been in existence the French might have found men enough to conquer Galicia or to attack northeastern Portugal in force. This was true throughout the whole of 1810 and 1811 and was a governing fact in the history of the Peninsula War."⁹ (Italics mine)

• DORSENNE did not last long, and the French commander Abbe signalized the opening of the year 1812 by the issuance of a proclamation which prohibited "quarter" for *guerrilleros*, made their families and villages responsible for them and authorized the execution of hostages. Mina promptly announced that he would shoot four Frenchmen for every Spaniard, a threat that he carried out with punctuality and exactitude. Abbe withdrew his proclamation and there was a true to terror while the French concentrated 30,000 troops to destroy the partisan chief and his band of 3,000. As the invaders busied themselves trying to track him down, Mina fell upon an immense convoy escorted by a force of 2,000 troops and completely destroyed it. The entire Army of the North spent the remainder of April and the month of May in futile pursuit of this phantom.

In June further employment awaited Cafarelli, the latest French commander in the area. Adm Sir Home

⁷Oman estimates it would have taken 150,000 to accomplish the pacification—even temporary—of the north of Spain at this time.

⁸"History of the Peninsular War," Vol IV p 464
⁹Ibid, p 474



Popham had at Wellington's direction concerted with Mendizabal, a well known *guerrillero* of the Biscay coast, a series of joint operations designed to prevent the Army of the North from aiding Marmont, who was opposing the English general. This joint campaign, brilliantly executed, culminated in the seizure of Santander, the most important port on the Biscay coast of Spain. Thus Mendizabal's partisans were assured of the supplies and equipment they had previously lacked. Until the close of the campaign in the Peninsula the contributions of the *guerrilleros* to Wellington's success continued to be of the utmost importance, but strangely enough, even after Napoleon's return from Moscow, they never seem to have made an impression on the Emperor's mind. If we follow him to Russia we will find him still dreaming of magnificent strategic and tactical combinations; still oblivious to the potential of well organized guerrilla war, conducted by capable leaders. "La Gloire" in Russia clung blindly to the obsessions that had dominated his war policy in Spain and had been his undoing. At this period of his career it may be said of him as Metternich said of the Bourbons: he learned nothing and he forgot nothing.

Moscow, the capital, beckoned him. Once the Emperor had established himself in the Kremlin the Tsar would come to terms; he would have to; everyone had always done it that way. He could not comprehend why the Tsar would not sue for surrender after Borodino. He berated the Russian generals as inept fools and cowards because after Borodino they would not stand and fight, but chose

instead to fall back slowly laying waste the countryside and arming the peasants. Swarms of hard riding cossacks and partisans attacked the flanks, rear and trains of the French Army. The people burned the hay ricks and villages, drove off the livestock, fired the crops standing in the fields and poisoned the wells. When Napoleon reached Moscow he established himself in the Imperial apartments in the Kremlin from whence he vainly endeavored to convince the Tsar and Kutuzov that Russia was beaten. But the Russians would not agree. Finally, frustrated, and unaware that the march to Moscow was but the prelude to the greatest debacle to be recorded in the annals of military history, the Emperor gave the order for retreat.

YEARS later Leo Tolstoi in *War and Peace* described the sombre spectacle of the Grande Armée stumbling down the ice covered road to Smolensk towards the border of Poland; herded along by Kutuzov, done to death by famine, winter, the blindness of its commander and the Cossacks and hordes of peasant guerrillas. This is what he wrote about the nature of the death struggles of the French Army, and about the agents who presided at that historic scene:

"The battle of Borodino with the occupation of Moscow and the flight of the French, that followed without any more battles, is one of the most instructive phenomena in history."

All historians are agreed that the external activity of states and peoples in their conflicts finds expression in wars; that the



From Moscow to the borders of Poland his freezing, starving army fell back through burned out towns from which all the inhabitants had fled. On the way the columns were continually harassed:

"Cossacks kept up perpetual raids along the roads, which they constantly crossed between one division and another—or even, when there was a gap, between one regiment and another. . . Wherever transport wagons were moving along in disorder, or unarmed stragglers were making their way as best they could, the Cossacks improvised sudden attacks, killing and wounding, robbing all those whose lives they spared, and looting wagons and carriages when they came upon them."

It is not difficult to imagine the perturbation spread by such tactics and their effects on the Army's morale. What was worse, they made communications extremely difficult, not only between one division and another. The General Staff, as I have already explained, received no reports; its orders either did not arrive at their destination or if they arrived were too late to be of any use. Staff officers, who braved every sort of danger, were frequently captured. Then there was the ice.¹⁰ . . of the many who went after food, but few returned. . . Cossacks and armed peasants captured many of those stragglers."¹¹

¹⁰From *With Napoleon in Russia* by Armand de Caulaincourt, William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1935, pp. 233-234, reprinted by permission of publishers.

¹¹Ibid, p 228

political power of states and peoples is increased or diminished as the immediate result of success or defeat in war.

Strange are the historical accounts that tell us how some king or emperor, quarrelling with another king or emperor, levies an army, fights a battle with the army of his foe, gains a victory, kills three, five, or ten thousand men, and consequently subdues a state and a whole people consisting of several millions; and incomprehensible it seems that the defeat of any army, one hundredth of the whole strength of a people, should force that people to submit. Yet all the facts of history (so far as we know it) confirm the truth of the statement, that the successes or defeats of a nation's army are the causes or, at least, the invariable symptoms of the increase or diminution of the power of a nation. An army gains a victory, and immediately the claims of the conquering people are increased to the detriment of the conquered. An army is defeated, and at once the people loses its rights in proportion to the magnitude of the defeat; and if its army is utterly defeated, the people is completely conquered. So (according to history) it has been from the most ancient times up to the present. All Napoleon's earlier wars serve as illustrations of the rule. As the Austrian armies were defeated, Austria was deprived of her rights, and the rights and power of France were increased. The victories of the French at Jena and at Auerstadt destroyed the independent existence of Prussia.

But suddenly, in 1812, the French gained a victory before Moscow. Moscow was taken, and in consequence of that, with no subsequent battles, not Russia, but the French army of six hundred thousand, and then Napoleonic France itself ceased to exist.

To strain the facts to fit the rules of history, to maintain that the field of Borodino was left in the hands of the Russians, or that after the evacuation of Moscow, there were battles that destroyed Napoleon's army—is impossible.

After the victory of the French at Borodino, there was no general engagement, nor even a skirmish of any great importance, yet the French army ceased to exist. What is the meaning of it? If it had been an example from the history of China, we could have said it was not an historical fact (the resource of historians, when anything will not fit in with their rules). If it had occurred in a conflict on a small scale, in which only small numbers of soldiers had taken part, we might have looked upon it as an exception. But all this took place before the eyes of our fathers, whom it was a question of life and death for their country; and the war was on a larger scale than any wars we know of.

The sequel of the campaign of 1812—from Borodino to the final expulsion of the French—has proved that victories are not

in accordance with all the rules of swordsmanship. One can imagine what confusion and obscurity would arise from his description of the duel!

The duellist, who insisted on the conflict being fought in accordance with the principles of the fencer's art, stands for the French; his opponent, who flung away his sword and snatched up a cudgel, did like the Russians; and the attempted description of the duel in accordance with the rules of swordsmanship has been given us by the historians of the war.

From the time of the burning of Smolensk a war began which did not follow any of the old traditions of warfare. The burning of towns and villages, the retreat after every battle, the blow dealt at Borodino and followed by retreat, the burning of Moscow, the capture of marauders, the seizing of transports—the whole of the irregular warfare was a departure from the rules.

Napoleon was aware of it, and from the time when he stood waiting in Moscow in the correct pose of the victorious fencer,



always a cause nor even an invariable sign of conquest; it has proved that the force that decides the fate of peoples does not lie in military leaders, nor even in armies and battles, but in something else.

The French historians, who describe the position of the French troops before they marched out of Moscow, assert that everything was in good order in the Grande Armee, except the cavalry, the artillery, and the transport, and that there was no forage for the horses and cattle. There was no remedy for this defect, because the peasants of the surrounding country burned their hay rather than let the French have it.

Victory did not bring forth its usual results, because the peasants, Karp and Vlas, by no means persons of heroic feelings (after the French evacuation, they hurried with the carts to pillage Moscow), and the immense multitude of others like them burnt their hay rather than bring it to Moscow, however high the prices offered them.

Let us imagine two men, who have come out to fight a duel with swords in accordance with all the rules of the art of swordsmanship. The fencing has lasted for some time. All at once one of the combatants, feeling that he is wounded, grasping that it is no joking matter, but a question of life and death, flings away his sword, and snatching up the first cudgel that comes handy, begins to brandish that. But let us imagine that the combatant, who has so sensibly made use of the best and simplest means for the attainment of his object, should be inspired by the traditions of chivalry to try and disguise the real cause of the conflict and should persist in declaring that he had been victor in the duel

and instead of his opponent's sword, saw the bludgeon raised against him, he never ceased complaining to Kutuzov and to the Emperor Alexander that the war was being conducted contrary to all the rules of war. (As though any rules existed for the slaughter of men!)

In spite of the complaints of the French that they did not keep to the rules, in spite of the fact that the Russians in the highest positions felt it somehow shameful to be fighting with a cudgel, and wanted to take up the correct position en quarte or en tierce, to make a skillful thrust, en prime and so on, the cudgel of the people's war was raised in all its menacing and majestic power; and troubling itself about no question of any one's tastes or rules, about no fine distinctions, with stupid simplicity, with perfect consistency, it rose and fell and belaboured the French till the whole invading army had been driven out.

And happy the people that will not, as the French did in 1813, saluting according to the rules, gracefully and cautiously offer the sword hilt to the magnanimous conqueror. Happy the people who, in the moment of trial, asks no questions how others would act by the recognized rules in such cases, but with ease and directness picks up the first cudgel that comes handy and deals blows with it, till resentment and revenge give way to contempt and pity.¹²

Napoleon had not learned in Spain and he did not

¹²War and Peace by Leo Tolstoi, translated by Constance Garnett, Random House, Modern Library edition, pp 970-972

learn in Russia that guerrilla warfare on the scale he experienced was an expression of pure patriotism as well as the popular manifestation of latent political ambitions. Both peoples knew tyrannies; they did not know the foreign tyranny which the Emperor and his army represented, but they feared it more than that which they knew.

Could Napoleon have dealt with the guerrilla situations in either Spain or France by measures purely military? There is a possibility that he could have done so, but not simultaneously, and not by the methods his commanders used. Wanton devastation, pillage, murder, and taking of hostages did not serve to suppress guerrillas in Spain and Russia. They have not, and will not, serve to suppress them anywhere.

THE SCENE of the next great drama in the history of partisan warfare is South Africa where the British and the Boer burghers fought a bitter guerrilla struggle for almost two years after the "war" was "over."

Lord Roberts who had been hastily despatched from London to retrieve the errors of Gen Sir Redvers Buller, his immediate predecessor as General Officer Commanding South Africa, had brought the war with the Boers to a "successful conclusion" in the autumn of 1900 and had sailed for home to accept the rewards and adulation that were in this instance prematurely accorded. He left the "mop-up" to his distinguished Chief of Staff, Kitchener of Khartoum. Lord Roberts, a man of considerable perspicacity, knew when "to get out from under."

As early as December 1900 guerrillas were Kitchener's major problem. In June 1901 the Boer leaders decided upon a policy of guerrilla warfare. This was a natural development but it is difficult to understand why it was so long aborning. Had a correct war policy been established by the Boer leaders at the beginning of hostilities the British would have been mired down in Africa for twenty years.

Kitchener had prior to June borrowed a page from Napoleon's Spanish book and built numbers of block houses along the railways running north from the Cape through the Transvaal and Orange Free State towards Rhodesia. The Free State was a rough rectangle with its long axis stretching some 320 miles from the northern boundary of Cape Colony to the southern boundary of Rhodesia. Following the long axis there was a single track rail line which from its southern terminus at Port Elizabeth ran north through Blomfontein and Kronstadt to Johannesburg and Pretoria. Paralleling the western border there was another north-south railway connecting Cape Colony with Kimberly and Mafeking.

This blockhouse system promised much, for it seemed that if the integrity of these rail lines could be guaranteed throughout their length two very desirable ends would

be achieved. First, forces and their supplies and equipment could be moved rapidly and safely; and, second, the Boers would be walled in (or walled out) of the area between the railroads. The commandos, thus isolated, were to be driven like coveys of grouse or herds of beasts into an ever more tightly circumscribed area, and then eliminated. But things did not work out exactly this way. The idea which was possibly inspired by Kitchener's shootin' and huntin' experiences, did not take on Boers, who inconsiderately evidenced no desire to fall in with any such plan for their extermination. They refused to be hemmed in by the blockhouses and to let the beaters work them into position for the kill.

IN THE SUMMER of 1901 "there was no sign that the Dutch farmers were tired of their friends the raiders."

"On the contrary, recruiting to the rebel ranks was distinctly on the increase; wherever the bands went they were sure of hospitality, refreshment, a few additional rifles and above all, information. A farmer would ride fifty miles with a warning to a commando, and that, it was often remarked, was more than most loyal farmers would do for the British."¹³

The strain of insufficient and incorrect information, or information that came too late, threads through the whole history of British South African operations just as it had through those of the French in Spain and Russia.

In August 1901 Kitchener made an attempt to bring an end to the activities by which a few thousand Boer partisans were wearing out a British force thirty times as great. He issued a proclamation which has few equals in the vast library composed of the pronunciamentos of generals. This British Commander in Chief had the effrontery to inform the Boers that they were not only a few in number but had lost nearly all their guns and munitions of war and their proper organization and were therefore incapable of carrying on regular warfare. The historians of the London *Times* aptly pointed out that

"it might have been answered that the reduction in numbers had gone hand in hand with aggressive vigour; that the loss of guns, so far from being a weakness had inspired more effective tactics; that while the British suffered from an excess of organization, the Boer organization, if not "proper," was eminently suited to its purpose, and that whether the hostilities were called "regular" or "irregular" was not of much account."¹⁴

The threats contained in the next several paragraphs of this remarkable paper were entirely without point since Kitchener was unable to carry them out. They served only to encourage the Boers to continue resistance that was in one year to cost the British thousands of casualties and to add half a billion dollars to the national debt. And be it remembered that half a billion at the turn of the century is equivalent to ten times that amount today.

Kitchener after having tried both threats and the policy of transporting Boer families, finally became convinced

¹³Pages 310-311, Vol V, *The Times History of the War in South Africa*.

¹⁴Pages 321-22 Vol V, *Ibid.*

that it was only by the use of highly mobile self-contained columns unencumbered with heavy equipment and slow transport that positive results could be obtained. He was a long time getting around to rediscovering the method first arrived at by the French in Spain.

"Mobility was requisite . . . on every military ground and for every military emergency, and it had been just as requisite on the first day of the war as it was now."¹⁵

But flying columns did not solve a problem which was no more susceptible of a purely military solution than had been that of the French in Spain and Russia.

As an example of what an accomplished guerrilla leader can do to "flying" columns we have only to look at the bare bones of Botha's raid into Natal in October, 1901. At that time with a force of less than 2,000 the Boer leader tied up seven or eight columns totalling over 16,000 troops. The British never laid a hand on him though he attacked them several times. If half a dozen columns such as Botha's had been able to conduct coordinated operations simultaneously over a wide area the results for the British would have been disastrous. The war in South Africa teaches many things, among them that the policy of transportation of non-combatant women and children from guerrilla areas confers a positive advantage on the partisans. Not only does it rid them of domestic responsibilities but it burdens the transporter with psychological and logistic problems of major proportions. Obviously it would be utterly impractical if applied to any considerable area with a numerous population.

THE CURTAIN next rises in the Middle East where Col T. E. Lawrence—Lawrence of Arabia—developed and applied his theories of guerrilla warfare against the Turks. The British by this time had obviously learned something from history and they empowered Lawrence to dangle the apple of freedom and independence before the eyes of the Arabs in exchange for active participation in the war and the cooperation of the world of nomadic Islam against the Turk.

Lawrence made a unique contribution to military thought. He perceived immediately that one of the great strengths of guerrillas was their pervasiveness; their ubiquity. Guerrillas could be everywhere, but at the same time be nowhere. To permit—indeed to encourage—the enemy to occupy cities and towns was not a bad idea, providing one could isolate them and keep them isolated. This the Arabs did with the Turkish garrison in Medina which sat in trenches destroying its own power of movement by "eating the transport" it "could no longer feed." The guerrillas ranged over 99% of Arabia; Turkish military power decayed in Medina and in their isolated outposts.

Lawrence developed his theory of guerrilla warfare

¹⁵Ibid, p 323



while he lay ill for several months. He was not too ill to reflect.

"I began idly to calculate how many square miles . . . perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing, intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.

Then I figured out how many men they would need to sit on all this ground, to save it from our attack—in depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of those hundred thousand square miles. I knew the Turkish army exactly, and even allowing for their recent extension of faculty by aeroplanes and guns and armored trains (which made the earth a smaller battlefield) still it seemed that they would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a fort would not be less than twenty men. If so they would need six hundred thousand men to meet the ill wills of all the Arab peoples, combined with the active hostility of a few zealots.

How many zealots could we have? At present we had nearly fifty thousand: sufficient for the day. It seemed the assets in this element of war were ours. If we realized our raw materials and were apt with them, then climate, railway, desert and technical weapons could also be attached to our interests. The Turks were stupid; the Germans behind them dogmatical. They would believe that rebellion was absolute, like war, and deal with it on the analogy of war. Analogy in human things was fudge any-



how; and war upon rebellion was messy and slow like eating soup with a knife."¹⁶

Lawrence was a sensitive man, and because he was he attempted to explore psychological and emotional realms with which the ordinary professional soldier is unfamiliar, and whose boundaries he ordinarily does not need or seek to cross. How to do what he had to do was a problem that Lawrence pondered a long time, for the Arabs could not afford the deaths of too many individual guerrilla fighters.

"An individual death, like a pebble dropped in water, might make a brief hole, yet rings of sorrow widened out therefrom."¹⁷ Strategy, tactics and psychology are all inextricably bound together in the world of the partisan.

"It was our obvious policy to be superior in some one tangible branch; gun cotton or machine guns or whatever would be made decisive. Orthodoxy had laid down the maxim applied to men of being superior at the critical point and moment of attack. We might be superior in equipment in one dominant moment or respect, and for both things and men we might give the doctrine a twisted negative side, for cheapness' sake and be weaker than the enemy everywhere except in that one point or matter. The decision of what was critical would always be ours. Most wars were wars of contact, both forces striving to touch to avoid tactical surprise. Ours should be a war of detachment. We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves 'till we attacked'."¹⁸

Of the psychological element in partisan war:

"We had to arrange (the minds of our men) in order of battle just as carefully and formally as other officers would arrange their bodies. And not only our own men's minds, though naturally they came first. We must also arrange the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them; then those other minds of the nation supporting us behind the firing line, since more than half the battle passed there in the back; then the minds of the enemy nation waiting the verdict; and of the neutrals looking on; circle beyond circle."¹⁹

Lawrence said that guerrillas must be able to

"plan in certainty. The chief agent must be the general's head and his understanding must be faultless, leaving no room for chance. Morale, if built on knowledge, was broken by ignorance. When we knew all about the enemy we should be comfortable. We must take more pains in the service of news than any regular staff."²⁰

Finally in a classical summation Lawrence wrote—and in precisely 153 words—the theory upon which the revolt in the Arabian desert was to be based:

"It seemed to me proven that our rebellion had an unassailable base, guarded not only from attack but from the fear of attack. It had a sophisticated alien enemy disposed as an army of occupation in an area greater than would be dominated effectively from

¹⁶The *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, T. E. Lawrence, Copyright 1926, 1935 by Doubleday & Co., Inc., pp. 192-193

¹⁷Ibid, p 194

¹⁸Ibid, 194

¹⁹Ibid, 194

²⁰Ibid, p 194

fortified posts. It had a friendly population of which some two in the hundred were active, and the rest quietly sympathetic to the point of not betraying the movements of the minority. The active rebels had the virtues of secrecy and self control and the qualities of speed, endurance, and independence of arteries of supply. They had technical equipment enough to paralyze the enemy's communications. A province would be won when we had taught the civilian in it to die for our ideal of freedom. The presence of the enemy was secondary. Final victory seemed certain, if the war lasted long enough for us to work it out."²¹

One cannot say that Lawrence was a greater guerrilla leader than Mina, de Wet, the Empecinado, or the unknown partisan heroes of 1812 in Russia, but one can say that he overshadows them all because he formulated a workable doctrine that expresses all the principles they and he applied with success. His incisive mind led him unerringly to a clear understanding of the conditions under which organized partisan warfare can be fashioned into a major strategical instrument; to a vivid appreciation of the psychological elements that are involved, and to the knowledge that here must be, as the only firm base on which guerrilla action may rest, an idea—an idea of freedom.

Lawrence was aware that success in partisan war is a factor of what Tolstoi called the "quality x."

"One of the most conspicuous and advantageous departures from the so-called rules of warfare is the independent action of men acting separately against men huddled together in a mass. Such independent activity is always seen in a war that assumes a national character. In this kind of warfare, instead of forming in a crowd to attack a crowd, men dispense in small groups, attack singly and at once fly, when attacked by superior forces, and then attack again, when an opportunity presents itself. Such were the methods of the guerrillas in Spain; of the mountain tribes in the Caucasus, and of the Russians in 1812.

War of this kind has been called partisan warfare on the supposition that this name defined its special significance. But this kind of warfare does not follow any rules of war, but is in direct contradiction to a well-known rule of tactics, regarded as infallible. That rule lays it down that the attacking party must concentrate his forces in order to be stronger than his opponent at the moment of conflict.

Partisan warfare (always successful, as history testifies) acts in direct contradiction of this rule.

Military science assumes that the relative strength of forces is identical with their numerical proportions. Military science maintains that the greater the number of soldiers, the greater their strength. *Les gros bataillons ont toujours raison.*

To say this is as though one were in mechanics to say that forces were equal or unequal simply because the masses of the moving bodies were equal or unequal.

Force (the volume of motion) is the product of the mass into the velocity.

In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something else, an unknown x."²²

This quality "x" Tolstoi calls "the spirit of the troops," and represents the greater or less desire to fight and to face dangers. This desire must be inspired by a great conception. In Arabia Lawrence defined this conception in the one word "freedom." — US MC

²¹Ibid, p 196


²²War and Peace, Leo Tolstoi, p. 972-973.

To be concluded next month

While World War I tunes "Over There" and "Made-moiselle from Armentieres" floated softly over the parade ground at Quantico recently, a 40-man honor guard of New York City's Veterans of Belleau Wood presented the Marine Corps with the colors adopted by their organization shortly after the war. Achievements of 5th and 6th Marines and 6th Machine Gun Battalion are commemorated by the colors, which were presented to the WW II USS "Belleau Wood" and carried by her until decommissioned.



Left to right: Rear Adm Alfred M. Pride, who commanded the USS "Belleau Wood" at the time of her commissioning; Mr Charles Hamm, Belleau Wood Veterans; Maj Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant, MCS, twice wounded at Belleau Wood.



1918: Gen Pershing decorates Marines who were cited for gallant conduct in the Battle of Belleau Wood.

In one of the fiercest battles of World War I, the 4th Marine Brigade, comprising the 5th and 6th Marines and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, distinguished itself. Sixth French Army later issued an order, in recognition of the outstanding service performed by the Marines, changing the name of the Bois de Belleau to Bois de la Brigade de Marine. War correspondent Floyd Gibbons gave the Marines excellent publicity concerning this battle but became a casualty himself, losing his left eye.

Belleau Wood Veterans Present Colors to Corps




Leathernecks and Top Hats

■ MARINE PARTICIPATION in major wars and expeditions from the Revolutionary War through World War II is a matter of record. Today, with names like Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima and Okinawa still ringing in our ears, the Marine is usually envisioned only in connection with the storming of islands, the securing of beachheads, the wiping-out of entrenched enemy positions on places like Mount Suribachi and the harbor of Saipan. Actually, however, the history of the U. S. Marine Corps includes a remarkable number of peacetime exploits, important armed actions in the furtherance of our national interests abroad, and semi-military activities which brought it in the closest possible contact with American diplomats abroad—so close, in fact, that on occasion Marine officers acted as diplomats themselves.

The history of our foreign relations shows that without the Marines, the diplomatic gestures of our statesmen on many occasions would have been received with little respect. The Marines have sometimes had the welcome assistance of the Army and foreign soldiers, marines and seamen, but more often they were alone, carrying out their missions—and doing so without causing international complications. There have been times when they were forced to endure the insults and derision of foreign people without recourse or retaliation.

During the early 1800s, in our dealings with the Barbary States, it was the U. S. Marines and seamen who were called upon to perform the unpleasant tasks made necessary by our faltering foreign policy. While our government leaders were sticking their heads in the sand of "peace at any price," and our citizens were clamoring for economy, the only Americans who felt the sting of dishonor were these Marines and seamen who had to suffer the degradation of personally laying tribute at the feet of the barbarians.



On 19 October 1800, when the USS *George Washington* sailed from Algiers, her Marines stood guard over a unique shipment—"a hundred negro women and children, four horses, 150 sheep, 25 horned cattle, four lions, four tigers, four antelopes, twelve parrots, and funds and regalia amounting to nearly \$1,000,000.00"—being transported from the Dey of Algiers, Mustapha, to the Sultan of Turkey. The Dey had incurred the displeasure of the Sultan, and had requested of Consul O'Brien the services of the *George Washington* to convey these "valuable presents" to Constantinople in an attempt to conciliate the Sultan.

The Bashaw of Tripoli, dissatisfied with his share of tribute from abroad, on May 14, 1801 ordered the flag-staff cut down in front of the U. S. Consulate. This act, together with the realization that our "presents" would not purchase immunity, finally forced the United States to adopt a somewhat belligerent attitude towards the Barbary States. The USS *Enterprise* engaged and captured the Tripolitan polacre *Tripoli* on 1 August 1801, which caused 2dLt Presley N. O'Bannon—who later was hailed as the hero of Derna—to write his Commandant that he had "noticed with pleasure the credit which the Marines did themselves . . . as they have given the Barbarians some hot lead as tribute."

Mr Thacker is a professional historian with the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. This article first appeared in the December 1949 American Foreign Service Journal. In the same issue, but in the editorial section, the following appeared:

In this issue there is an article about the United States Marines and the United State Foreign Service, or, as the author put it, Leathernecks and Top Hats.

We like to run stories about outfits which are good precisely because they think they are, and vice versa.

Here is a group whose pride of service sets a standard even in the proud and larger service of which it is a part. In the Defense establishment, as in the Department of State, the recurrent waves of reorganization are never still. We do not know what the future holds for the Marines nor would we presume to offer suggestions.

But we expect that, even in these days of inexorable unification, their esprit de corps and the sources from which it rises will be upheld as national assets, yes even at the price of form and balance in the charts of the advisers on administrative management.

By Joel D. Thacker

Later, when William Eaton, who had been "Navy agent" in addition to his post as United States Consul in Tunis, had his request for 100 marines as a landing party turned down by Commodore Samuel Barron, it was Lt O'Bannon and his seven enlisted Marines who formed the heart of the conglomerate army of about 500 Greeks and Arabs, assembled by Eaton for a land expedition against Derna. Although outnumbered nearly 100 to one, O'Bannon and his Marines kept this motley force together and brought it over the desert, in spite of dissatisfaction, mutinies and quibbling among leaders of the different factions, lack of rations and water, and many other difficulties. Eaton later wrote that Hamet's followers would have fled to the desert if it had not been for the "firm and decided conduct of Mr O'Bannon."

After a difficult march of nearly 600 miles, during which some of the 107 camels had to be slaughtered for food, Eaton's army arrived at Bomba where the USS *Argus* furnished supplies. Eaton arrived before Derna on April 25, 1805 and immediately offered terms of amity to the Governor of Derna on condition of allegiance and fidelity to Hamet. The Governor's reply was curt and crisp: "*My head or yours.*" The next day the attack on Derna commenced, during which O'Bannon and his Marines, a few Greeks and cannoniers charged the fortress and planted the U. S. flag on its ramparts. The Tripolitans launched a number of fierce counterattacks and each time were repulsed. Finally, on May 28, 1805, a bayonet charge led by O'Bannon's Marines, drove the Tripolitans from the vicinity. Memories of these Marines and seamen still linger in the songs of the women of Derna: "*Din din Mohammed U Ryas Melekan mahandi,*" the literal translation of which means "Mohammed for Religion and the American for stubbornness."

After the end of hostilities with the Barbary States, Marines continued to play an important part in the diplomatic affairs in the Mediterranean. The Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Tunis died in October, 1806, and 2dLt Charles D. Coxe, commanding the Marines of the USS *Hornet*, arrived at Tunis on 8 December and took charge of the U. S. Mission in the absence of any consular official. Tobias Lear, Consul General of the United States to the Barbary Powers, arrived at Tunis in January 1807, to iron out certain differences with Tunis. Before he left in March, he confirmed Lt Coxe as U. S. representative giving him an appointment as Chargé d'Affaires. Coxe continued to serve as such until 1809 when he was appointed Consul to Tunis. He held this post until his death in the fall of 1830. It is interesting if not unique to note that Lt Coxe continued to hold his commission in the Marine Corps until 23 December 1809, when he resigned—at the insistent request of the Secretary of the Navy.

From 1809 through the War of 1812, a number of offi-




Photo of painting by LtCol J. J. Capolino

cers served the State Department as confidential couriers to U. S. Ministers in France and England. 1stLt Samuel Miller, who was wounded in the Battle of Bladensburg in August, 1814, wrote that "During the administration of Mr Madison, I was repeatedly employed to confidential service, both in Europe and at home." On July 10, 1810, Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton directed Lt Miller to proceed to France, his orders reading: "You are to receive the despatches with which the Honbl., the Secretary of State will intrust you and will immediately proceed to New York and take passage on board the *Hornet* . . . to land you at the Port of Havre, whence you are to proceed to Paris and deliver your despatches."

In 1846, during the war with Mexico, 1stLt Archibald Gillespie was selected as confidential messenger to carry special instructions from President Polk and the Secretary of State to U. S. Consul Larkin and Capt Fremont in California. Gillespie, traveling as a salesman




Photo of painting by LtCol J. J. Capolino

for Scotch whiskey, successfully accomplished his important mission.

In 1856, the Marines led the assault in the capture of the barrier forts of Canton in retaliation for the unprovoked attack by the Chinese on a U. S. ship flying the American flag. Ten years later, when the U. S. Consul at Newchwang (Yingkow), China, was assaulted by a band of dissolute characters, led by a gangster called "Sword Rack Hoo," Marines were landed to handle the situation. After the Chinese authorities had admitted that they were powerless to arrest Sword Rack, the Marines brought him in and then stood guard over him until he had been tried and punished.

In 1900, the Chinese Boxers got a little too rough with "The fist of righteous harmony" and the foreign ministers at Peking called for help. A small force of Marines and seamen, including 52 U. S. Marines from the *Oregon* and *Newark*, were landed at Taku the latter part of May and managed to reach Peking before it was cut off by the Boxers. As this force was so small compared to that which

the Boxers had available at the scene, additional forces were requested. An Allied relief expedition, consisting of United States, Austrian, British, French, German, Italian and Japanese forces, was hurriedly organized and started to the relief of the besieged city. The expedition encountered strong resistance in the vicinity of Tientsin, however, and was itself surrounded and besieged. Additional U. S. Marines and Army troops were then ordered up from the Philippines.

Meanwhile, the small detachments of U. S. Marines and Allied troops at Peking were in a desperate situation. The Boxers tightened the ring around the legations and at the same time kept up a continuous fire of small arms and artillery; they pillaged and burned the missions and killed hundreds of native Christians. The besieged nationals, completely cut off from the rest of the world, were forced to eat horse and mule meat and rice. They made sand bags of richest silks, satins, and fine embroideries so that the Marines could build barricades on the city wall. The ladies of the missions made trousers for the Marines, as their change of clothing did not arrive from Tientsin. Mrs Conger, wife of the U. S. Minister, later wrote:

"These Marines are sorely tired, for their clothes are soiled and warm and they have to wear them day and night. . . It is getting quite hot. I never saw such swarms of flies, mosquitoes, and fleas. . . our marines as a body have been brave, faithful, and untiring from beginning to end. They have never faltered even when standing at the most dangerous post. The city wall is a testing-place, and they have fought most bravely there and elsewhere. Would that I could sing their true praises so loudly that the whole world could hear them. . . ."

In 1903, the Marines escorted the American Consul-General to Addis Ababa, capital of Abyssinia, to arrange a treaty with King Menelik. They rode mules and camels over 300 miles of desert and mountains, carrying the Stars and Stripes to the country between the Red Sea and the Blue Nile for the first time. The route was infested with half-savage tribes of natives. The chief camel man insisted on taking the wrong route (for which he was bound hand and foot by the Marine captain), and one of the tribal chieftains demanded 100 talers (about \$47.00) to guarantee the caravan from attack. Brushing aside these petty annoyances, the expedition arrived to within a few miles of Addis Ababa, where the Marines changed into their "special full dress uniforms." The march was continued into the capital along a route lined with thousands of the Emperor's special warriors, fantastically garbed in lion or leopard skins and mounted on splendid Arabian horses or Zebra-like mules. These troops escorted the expedition into the capital where the Marines were assigned a "palace" as quarters while guests of the King. On Christmas Eve, the Marines, in full dress uniform, performed a few drills for which they were complimented by the King. Before leaving Addis Ababa the King presented the Menelik medal to the enlisted men and the Star of Ethiopia to the officers.

Although the Marines' tact and sympathetic understanding have established a reputation for "getting along" with peoples of the world, regardless of race, creed, color, or religion, there have been a few occasions where the plain cussedness of human nature has embroiled them in serio-comical situations.

Shortly after the siege of Peking had been lifted, gossip in the so-called "diplomatic social set" hinted that during the fighting in Peking one of the two U. S. Marine officers, Capt Newt H. Hall, was not as brave as a Marine should be. Capt Hall, a young blue-eyed Texan, demanded that he be brought before a court of inquiry. In acquitting Hall of the charge of cowardice, the President of the Court of Inquiry reported:

"... Before concluding its work the court feels called upon to remark that there will be found in the record a great deal of incidental or collateral evidence going to show the prevalence of a feeling adverse to Capt Hall, officially and socially at the United States Legation, which naturally would not tend to minimize any mistake or unpopular act on his part.

"Feminity figures on certain pages, and it is plainly indicated that some of the severest criticisms of Captain Hall are traceable to the same residence which extols into heroic importance a civilian who is incidentally condemned by evidence adduced by the defence . . . it is regrettable that Captain Hall could not be confronted with his principal accusers, . . . : but their attendance, in spite of repeated efforts, the court was unable to secure."

On 1 June 1901, the *Army and Navy Register* published an item concerning the "advancement" of this Marine officer, in which it reported:

"... While the naval authorities decline to permit examination of the record of the court it is understood that it contains the testimony that Captain Hall became unpopular with certain Americans because he declined to direct his Marines to salute ladies attached to the American legation, giving as his reason that constant saluting was fatiguing to the men who were pretty well exhausted from the hard work of defending the legations from the Chinese besiegers. . . ."

During World War I, Marine non-commissioned officers were regularly employed by the State Department as diplomatic couriers between the State Department and U. S. diplomatic missions in Europe. Although some of their experiences with enemy secret agents would undoubtedly make interesting reading, suffice it to say that not one single despatch fell into enemy hands.

One of the outstanding examples of Marines serving in diplomatic posts was that of BrigGen John H. Russell who was appointed, 11 February 1922, as High Commissioner of the United States to Haiti with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary, an unusual position for an officer of the regular service. He served in this position, as the direct representative of the President of the United



Upon retirement, Gen Holcomb became an ambassador.

States, for nearly nine years during which time his intelligent handling of a delicate and complicated situation earned for him the confidence and commendations not only of the officials of Haiti but of his own government as well.

Perhaps the finest exemplification of the interrelationship between the Marine Corps and the Foreign Service is furnished by the distinguished career of Gen Thomas Holcomb, who was a member of the Legation guard in Peking from 1905 to 1906 and again between 1908 and 1910, and who capped a distinguished career in the Marine Corps with an equally distinguished tour of duty as American Ambassador to the Union of South Africa.

Gen Holcomb, who is the first Marine to attain the ranks of lieutenant general and "full" general, and who is justly famed for his role in developing the superior marksmanship of the Marines, was a member of the Legation staff in Peking in the years immediately after his service with the Legation's guard (1908 to 1910). He later returned, in 1927, to become Commanding Officer of the Detachment. This service with a diplomatic mission does not seem to have done his military career the slightest harm for nine years later, in 1936, he attained to the position of Commandant of the Marine Corps, a position which he held for eight years, before accepting the post of ambassador.

Today, the Marines guarding United States diplomatic missions abroad are not bodies with full heavy combat equipment—as in the days of the legation guard at Peking—troops capable of carrying the attack to any hostile forces threatening our interests. But they can be depended upon to guard the security of such foreign posts and if necessary to defend them against all comers, with all the vigor and resources at their command, in line with the high traditions of the Marine Corps and in keeping with its inspiring motto: *Semper Fidelis.*

USMC

Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

Invasion Planning . . .

OVERTURE TO OVERLORD—LtGen Sir Frederick Morgan. 289 pages, index. New York: Doubleday and Co.

The fact that the Allies invaded the Normandy coast on the 6th of June 1944 is, I suppose, one of the better-known facts of life. But relatively few people, other than those actually concerned in such matters, have other than the foggiest notion of what preceded this gigantic undertaking—endless months of planning and preparation and often frustration.

In March of 1943 LtGen Sir Frederick Morgan was appointed Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, an unwieldy title that was quickly abbreviated to "COSSAC." At the same time he was given his mission, which consisted simply of preparing the plans for the invasion of Northwest Europe; the target date was "early in 1944." This was a fairly largish order to give an organization which at that time consisted only of Gen Morgan, but the real joker lay in the fact that Gen Morgan was Chief of Staff to—no one. There was no Supreme Allied Commander and at that time in 1943 there was no clue as to who this awesome figure would be. Gen Eisenhower was not appointed until early in December 1943 and did not arrive in London until the 15th of January, 1944.

Overture to Overlord is Gen Morgan's account of the trials and tribulations of the COSSAC headquarters from April of 1943 until Gen Eisenhower and his people took over. As COSSAC Gen Morgan was representing someone who did not, in fact, exist. It is a tribute to his ability, tact, and energy that his staff accomplished the vast amount of vital work that they did. True, the plan for the invasion, as presented by COSSAC, called for an assault on a front of only three divisions. Gen Montgomery recommended, and Gen Eisenhower approved, increasing the initial landing to an attack by five divisions. The COSSAC planners had always believed that three divisions was not a sufficient force to do the job, but they had been directed to use such a figure and they did not have sufficient power at court to demand an increase—just one of the many difficulties of not having a flesh-and-blood boss who can present the case to the top authorities on a "take it or leave it" basis, as Gen Eisenhower did.

Gen Morgan has written a very readable personal story of the birth and growth of what was later to become SHAEF. Particularly illuminating are his thoughts on Anglo-American staff procedures and organization, as well as his comments on command relationships. His views are considered and temperate, expressing a width of vision that is not always apparent among many professionals when dealing with the thorny subject of combined operations.

So far as I know there is no other book available today that will give the reader as interesting and valuable account of the events leading up to the time when SHAEF took over the reins, as that to be found in *Overture to Overlord*. It is a record of events most of which I daresay are unknown except to those few who were involved in them. Recommended.

Reviewed by LtCol R. McC. Tompkins

Navy Matters . . .

ALL THE SHIP'S AT SEA. William J. Lederer, Commander, USN. William Sloane Associates, Inc., New York, 1950. 292 pp. \$3.00

This reviewer had been looking forward for some time to reading the book, and he had thought the title an uncommonly good one for a volume devoted to Navy matters. The sight of that apostrophe in the third word, however, gave him a mild feeling of nausea, for he confesses to a profound allergy to "cute" things.

And he is happy to note, here and now, that Lederer has been victimized, apparently, by one of those curious beings who write titles as a form of expiation for nameless sins committed in previous incarnations. For this book is a good one—it is readable, it is full of laughs, and it has a deep substratum of sound thought that one gets only after having enjoyed the better part of the book.

Now and again we come across an author who possesses what is, for the writer, an almost invaluable gift—that of being able to let his story tell itself. The author here has such a gift. He starts each of his tales with what amounts to a gentle push, and from that point onward he seems to be running to keep up with it. The little bit of editorializing that he does sometimes has a breathless char-

acter, as though he wanted to get his licks in before the tale got clear away from him and out of sight.

The book is a collection of anecdotes, some of which were written for publication in one of the other of the big slick magazines. At least two of them were so published. This means, of course, that those tales are as stylized as a Balinese dance, but it also means that they are quick moving and full of action and that they carry you along. Also, they call up before the reader, if he is Navy or Marine Corps or Army (I cannot speak for the Air Force), memories from his own not too spotless past in the service. When the covers go shut on the last page, the reader has the distinct impression of having known Lederer somewhere.

The truth is, of course, that we have all known him, under one name or another, for he is one of the great basic types of the armed services. He is the military man who never quite outgrows a bent for indulging in an amiable kind of rascality. He is the mild Bolshevik who, bored with the endless and maddening routine duties and prohibitions of military life, sets about circumventing them with a singleminded devotion to his task. He is a curse to those of his superiors who are stuffed shirts, and he is a blessing to his fellows. He is likewise a blessing to his commanding officer, whether, that worthy admits it or not.

For where there is a Lederer in an outfit, there is surecease from boredom. Things are unpredictable, and the stuff may hit the fan at any moment, and where such a condition obtains no one—and least of all the CO—can safely sit back and let the outfit run itself. He and the men under him are on their toes and looking alive. No one gets complacent, and the unit, be it a company or a battalion or a crew, has an indefinable something that sets it apart from other less fortunate units. Sometimes we say that it has *esprit*, for want of a better word.

The tales which the author tells are varied, and while some of them may rub a formalist the wrong way, we suspect that this will be quite OK by the author. There is the story of how the author got to Annapolis—quite fittingly, this one leads off the book, and in a sense all the others stem from it. This reviewer is not quite sure, yet, just what Lederer's philosophy may be, but he suspects that it can be dug out of this first tale. Then there is the tale of a relative of one Hymie O'Toole—a grandfather's third cousin on the father's side. This intricately connected relative of the author's bosom pal was also a Navy man, and this reviewer has no hesitancy whatever in recommending that you read how he got his travel orders changed.

Also worthy of at least passing mention is the tale of how the author acquired an establishment in Chefoo, and that which tells how the *Litch* made sure of the services of one Isadore Feinberg as ship's cook. It is almost certain that Maggie, the Toast of Glasgow, never appeared

on the pages of a national magazine (by the way, whatever happened to *Captain Billy's Whiz-Bang?*) and the account of California Asparagus will never be reprinted for use in the indoctrination of boots.

So much for the amusing part of the book and the qualities which will keep it in your hand until you have finished it. There is something else about it that is by no means as obvious, and yet is much more valuable and permanent than any of the stories themselves. There is no plot, and the continuity is supplied only by the recurrence of certain characters like O'Toole and Feinberg and big Abe Brown. But running through the whole string of anecdotes is Lederer's idea of what should constitute personal relationships in the service. After we have finished the book and let what we have read lie fallow for a while, we begin to realize that the author has done a lot more than amuse us with a collection of well told tales. He has, in fact, read us quite a lesson in that completely elusive and intangible thing called leadership, and he has slipped us the dose so skilfully that we recognize the pill only long after it is down and has begun to take effect.

And this reviewer offers to bet, here and now, that the effect will be invariably good.

Reviewed by Maj John L. Zimmerman

Ambassador's Report . . .

MY THREE YEARS IN MOSCOW—Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith. 335 pages and index, illustrated. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. \$3.75

Gen Smith had just returned from occupation duty in Germany in early 1946 when Secretary of State Byrnes requested his services as Ambassador to Russia. In that capacity, he arrived in Moscow on 28 March, 1946, and remained there until March, 1949.

During and immediately after the war, Gen Smith had worked with various Russian officers, beginning in North Africa. This experience, he hoped, would give him some background for his new assignment. He soon discovered, however, that he had much to learn about Russia and the Russians. He found that his contact with high ranking Soviet military men during the war had made him overoptimistic about the possibility of achieving cordial relations with the Soviet government or its officials.

My Three Years in Moscow is an account of Gen Smith's experiences and efforts as Ambassador, together with his impressions of Russia, his conclusions drawn from facts available to him, and his recommendations as to our future relations with the Soviet Union and Soviet aggression in general. Some of the book is a personal account, describing the manner in which the State Department prepared him for his assignment, the living conditions of the Ambassador and his staff in Moscow, and his personal activities. Most of it is an effort to present a clear picture of Russia today: Soviet conditions, Soviet aims, and Soviet methods. Restrained touches of humor,

and anecdotes here and there, add to the pleasure of reading without detracting from the substance of the book.

This is good "background" reading for the military man. It is important reading for all but those who have followed the news of Russia most carefully.

While it adds little that is "new" to the literature on Russia, offering no "inside information" or startling interpretations, *My Three Years in Moscow* tells as much, in general terms, about contemporary Russia as an alert American observer can find out. Most of the content has appeared elsewhere; here it is neatly organized in a matter-of-fact, skilfully written book. The author concedes that even for an Ambassador it is difficult to find out much about Russia from the Russians. In general, he avoids conjecture and inference; where it was necessary to draw inferences to form opinions, he clearly states that he has done so.

Several chapters are headed with quotations from dispatches of the American Minister to Russia, Neill S. Brown, dated nearly a hundred years ago. These quotations refer to conditions similar to those we see in Russia today—the secrecy, the distrust of foreigners, the police state methods. The cumulative effect of these quotations, coupled with Gen Smith's careful explanations and comparisons, is to illustrate the important fact that Great Russianism is a continuing and basic factor in Soviet policy; that we are facing essentially the same Russia as in the past, except for her increased strength and influence. Soviet policy "is the offspring of a marriage between Great Russian imperialism and Communist ideology." All plans for world revolution call for domination by Soviet Russia. Communist revolutionaries everywhere must look to Russia for instructions, both before and after they set up their local "dictatorships of the proletariat."

It is important that such points be brought into focus for us, lest we take too lightly the efforts of world communism, and the significance of its final objective. The author considers such notions as that which depicts the Communist as an unshaven, ill-fed radical seeking to share the wealth, and that which depicts Russia as full of "seething resentment against the Communist regime" to be dangerously complacent. Communism is strong and well-organized; Communist doctrine includes long range plans and great patience. Basic plans remain the same, although superficial policies may shift to meet the needs of propaganda or international politics. Most Russians have no idea of personal liberty or of the processes of democracy. "Those who did understand such things don't live there any more. They are in prison or dead."

"In pursuit of the final Communist goal, the Soviet leaders will limit themselves to 'all means short of war,' so long as they believe that the outcome of a war would be uncertain, i.e., until they are confident that the strength controlled by the Soviet Union has far surpassed that of

the United States." It is quite unjustifiable, the former Ambassador states, to hope for a change of heart.

The final chapter lists the positive steps that Gen Smith feels we should take to ensure world peace and to retain our world position. The United States should "use its own strength to shield the free nations of Europe from aggression while they rebuild their own defenses, just as we are using our material resources to help them revive their economies." A free and friendly Europe would "contain a population greater than that of the Soviet Union, much further advanced in science and technology, with resources much better developed, and an industrial organization much more efficient and productive." In addition to military and economic strength, says the author, we need moral strength and a strong faith in democracy.

My Three Years in Moscow also includes a number of interesting discussions of such subjects as internal and external propaganda, the history of the Comintern and Cominform, the Tito affair, the "Voice of America" and its effect in Russia, the workings of the Politburo; and a general statement of Russian military strength.

Reviewed by Maj Alan R. Cason

Pioneers in the Air . . .

HITCH YOUR WAGON—Bernt Balchen, Clayton Knight and Robert C. Durham. 332 pages, illustrated. Drexel Hill, Penna.: Bell Publishing Co. \$3.50

To some men falls the lot of the pioneer; Bernt Balchen is one of these. As the pioneer of them all in Arctic flying, he is known far and wide as "Mister Cold Weather." This is the story of his life, from his early rebellious boyhood as the son of a tough Norwegian country doctor, through his service with the Norwegian Army and Navy, the United States Army Air Corps, the aviation industry, and several Arctic and Antarctic expeditions, in which he was associated with such other men of fame and pioneering as Anthony Fokker, the airplane designer, Adm Byrd, and Roald Amundsen, explorers.

However, this is no ordinary biography of a man who is still knocking around somewhere. It is an adventure story and a novel. Through the eyes of all the people who could tell about Bernt Balchen, the authors have built a story that will fascinate those of us who have dreamed of high adventure, and it will satisfy many a chair-bound longing to know what makes in the world of derring-do. To the interested and the uninitiate, it will add understanding of the hard work and technical excellence which forms the background of progress in the exact science of aviation.

Balchen is no standard mortal created to fit a pattern in which most of us could discern ourselves. He has little to say, and the things revealed in this tale of his life and growth come from others who may have had a chance to watch him, live with him, or serve with him.

The facts are made to speak eloquently for themselves, and what they have to tell form the stuff of which small boys' heroes are made.

Of perhaps greatest interest to aviators and to the layman alike will be the accounts of the Polar expeditions in which Balchen had a hand, and the exploits of both Balchen and his crews in World War II. The Polar expeditions are true adventures; it is doubtful if they have been recounted as well or as entertainingly before. The War episodes are a mixture of hard work, quiet heroism, and satisfactory participation in considerable cloak-and-dagger business with Norwegian and Swedish non-conformists who didn't see quite eye-to-eye with the Germans.

A singular high spot in a life of climax and anti-climax is Balchen's part in the trans-Atlantic flight with Adm Byrd which ended in a water landing at night off the coast of France. In 1927, the Orteig prize had been offered for the first flight from New York to Paris. At Roosevelt Field in New York, several planes and crews were being readied at the same time to make the attempt. Nungesser and Coli started from France and disappeared over the Atlantic. Cmdr Davis was killed in Virginia getting ready for his try; Rene Fonck crashed while testing his Sikorski. Byrd's ship, the *America*, had been repaired after a previous test flight crash, and was undergoing new preparatory tests. But Lindberg, in the *Spirit of St. Louis*, took off in the early morning of May 20th, 1927, and won the "race." Adm Byrd had kept his eye not on a race for the prize money, but on a scientific test flight to evaluate new equipment, instruments, and procedures, and to check the feasibility of long over-water flights. So the *America* made her flight after the "race" was over, and through the knowledge, skill, and determination of such men as Byrd and Balchen, the cause of aviation was advanced no little bit, because they found many of the answers to problems since faced by others who have wanted to fly the North Atlantic for one reason and another. Much of the foundation for success of the world's transoceanic airlines today can be traced to such pioneering efforts as this one of Byrd and Balchen. But the story of that flight, as told in this volume, is one to stir the blood of men who can understand the hard work behind these deeds, and the long tensions which make the end of the flight almost an anticlimax.

Both the authors are aviators themselves. Clayton Knight flew in the first World War, and was a correspondent and combat historian in World War II. Robert C. Durham was a World War II pilot of Liberators used in the cloak-and-dagger business with both the French Underground, and in the Norwegian-Swedish operations directed by Balchen. At one time he was Balchen's executive officer. These two men have written a fine, clear story of the life and times of one man—but they have made of it an adventurous history of many men and many events;

their facts are as strange, and as readable, as the best of fiction.

Reviewed by Col E. P. Pennebaker, Jr

Berlin Experiences . . .

BERLIN COMMAND—BrigGen Frank Howley, USA. 276 pages. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$3.50

This is the story of the city government of Berlin from the day the first American soldiers marched in until September, 1949. The book is roughly chronological but the author does not hesitate to discard the actual sequence of events in order to show cause and effect.

The author, Gen Howley, was a Philadelphia advertising man who switched from the cavalry to military government because of injuries. He warmed up for his jobs as Assistant Commandant and Commandant of the U. S. sector of Berlin and as the military governor of Cherbourg and Paris. He writes in the first person of his actual experiences during four years in Berlin.

The purpose of the book is two-fold: first; to show the folly of trying to get along with the Russians by acquiescence or appeasement; and, second; to draw a picture of the character of the individual Russian.

To accomplish the first purpose, Gen Howley relates a long list of broken and unfulfilled Russian promises starting with the failure to allow British, French, or Americans access to Berlin until July 4, 1945 and ending with the famous, or should I say infamous, blockade. The complete thoroughness of the Russian attempts to gain advantage is demonstrated in their insistence on noon to midnight working hours for the Allied Council of Commandants (Kommandatura) by which they were able to secure concessions merely because of the hunger and exhaustion of the other members and their objection to teaching the Germans to play baseball.

To accomplish the second purpose, stories of the rape, pillage, and looting of Berlin are told. All of these incidents happened in the American sector after the Americans had taken over. The soldier who shot a German girl to get her wristwatch, the officer and four men who held up a train and systematically looted it, and the five soldiers who raped a 60 year old woman in her own garden adequately paint the individual character.

To tie the two purposes together, the author uses such hard-hitting sentences as "They will promise anything, sign anything, provided it benefits them, and will scrap the pledge the moment it doesn't." and ". . . by any standards of common decency, they are liars, swindlers, and cutthroats."

Secondarily, the book is a severe criticism of the Allies—the French for their natural reticence to build up the Germans to combat the Russians—the British for their dollar-mindedness—the Americans for failing to better prepare the army for its military government duties—and

collectively for separating the military from the political objectives of war, failure to capture Berlin, and refusal to recognize the true aims of the Soviet even after repeated evidence of its deep-rooted desires for conquest.

Gen Howley doesn't stop with criticizing collectively; individuals, including Generals Eisenhower and Clay, come in for their share. In fact, it might be said that *Berlin Command* criticizes everything and everyone except Gen Howley and our late enemies, the Germans.

On one score, *Berlin Command* presents a rosy and hopeful picture. The story of the German's fight for self government and democratic elections is indeed an encouraging one. The loyalty of the people of Berlin in the western sectors to the French, British, and Americans during the blockade when the Russians were offering them food and coal makes one realize that adherence to the ideals of decency and humanity are recognized even by cold, hungry, and defeated peoples.

In the final chapter, the author summarizes the book, tells of progress toward correcting the defects he has criticized, offers solutions to other defects and warns that "Russia will attack us without hesitation when she judges that the time and the conditions are right."

As a literary effort the book is not much, but as food for thought it is well worth reading. The weight of evidence against the Soviet and its aims is tremendous. If anything is needed by the average American to dispel the aura of tolerance toward Russia and Communism which was built up during the war, *Berlin Command* more than fulfills that need.

Reviewed by LtCol William F. Prickett

Italian Policy Study . . .

ITALY FROM NAPOLEON TO MUSSOLINI—René Albrecht-Carrié. 300 pages. New York, N. Y.: Columbia University Press. \$4.25

Ever since Cavour pieced together the patchwork quilt of Italy, this nation has been notorious as the mugwump of Europe, the perennial fence-sitter, the jackal eager for a share of the lion's kill. Why has she persisted in her uncertain, unprincipled course?

Dr Albrecht-Carrié adopts the realistic approach that politics and ethics are utterly unrelated, and that by a skilful and consistent use of power, this comparatively weak nation has time and again achieved her ends. The "power" at times might be likened to the few grains of sand that tip the balance, but power it is, in such an instance.

The title of this volume is misleading, for in no way is it a chronological panorama of Italy from the time of the great Napoleon to the days of the would-be Napoleon. It is rather an analytical study of the course of Italian policy, delving into the reasons for her past tight-rope performances in the political arena and, above all, giving the background, and hence the *raison d'être*, for the his-

torical phenomenon of Fascism.

Fascism, while not inevitable, was certainly a logical reaction to a pathetic state of affairs. When Italy emerged as a united nation in 1870, she was not a nation like Britain or France with strong nationalist feeling, but a political federation of self-willed municipalities. The industrial revolution came late to Italy and her poverty and backwardness were always to keep her from the place of wealthier countries on the continent. That she managed to be classed as a great power by the time of the First World War was due in large measure to her success in wheedling concessions from first one power, then another, and by placing bets on both sides of the board. Thus in 1902 the Prinetti-Barriere exchanges arranged neutrality with France while the Triple Alliance tied her to Austria-Hungary and Germany. Italy's success in gradually acquiring the acquiescence of all nations to her territorial lust for Tripoli in 1911 is paralleled by the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935, opening the door to Abyssinia.

Despite continual success in the perilous game of power politics, Italy from its beginning, from the death of Cavour, was led by men of second-rate statesmanship supported by a floundering Parliament. Crispi the grandiose dreamer, Giottili—shrewd but prosaic, Orlando the procrastinator, are among the figures who shaped Italy's course and paved the way for the breakdown of the parliamentary system and the March on Rome. That the weary Italians turned to the strong personality of Mussolini is scarcely surprising.

The final denouement was the result of a predicament aptly characterized by an earlier Italian, that archetype of politicians, Machiavelli:

"The most unfortunate situation into which a state can fall is when neither peace can be accepted nor war can be continued. . . But into such a situation the state can only fall if it has followed a clumsy and mistaken policy, and if it has overrated its own forces."

The author, Dr René Albrecht-Carrié, is well qualified for the scholarly task he has set for himself. Born in Smyrna, his early years were spent in Italy and France, and since coming to America in 1920 his life has been devoted to historical study. *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* was an earlier product of his research. At present Dr Albrecht-Carrié is an Assistant Professor of History at Barnard College.

This admirably written study is not for the casual reader. Since it makes interpretive use of the material of Italian history, offhand references to obscure treaties are dashed off without further elaboration. Unless one is a close student of modern history or has a reference text for constant use (as had the reviewer), it would be impossible to read this book with full understanding. However, for the lay reader with the patience to make frequent reference to historical texts, this volume will be an absorbing and rewarding experience.

Reviewed by Maj James H. Naylor

Stalin's Army . . .

THE RED ARMY TODAY—Col Louis B. Ely, USA. 207 pages illustrated. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company. \$3.50

The biggest surprise of World War II was the resistance of the Russians against the German horde. It was estimated that the Red Army would be severely crippled or annihilated within a minimum period of time. This military expectation proved false and the Soviet war machine emerged victorious, underwent further development as a result of lessons learned through bitter experience to become today the largest land army on earth.

History tells us the realms that are built and made great by the sword are like flowers in that they arise, bloom, wither and die. Is this great combatant force molded by a militant philosophy an exception—an invincible power which exists solely to destroy international tranquillity? Col Ely answers these questions in a professionally meticulous and inclusive evaluation of the modern Red Army—its structure, capabilities and irregularities. Through the medium of hypothetical Russian officers whose opinions are a combination of the actual sources from which the information was obtained, the reader is given a detailed representation of the various arms or branches which make up the Soviet military organization. The chapters dealing with infantry, artillery, air support and partisan warfare are particularly worthy of consideration by interested parties within our own armed forces. The clear, factual style of the author is augmented by interjections of colorful historical examples showing the working of the Russian mind. The timely comparisons of the organization, equipment and tactics of the Red Army with western armies, and his analysis of the integrated influence of the Communist Party upon this military body, will aid the reader in better understanding the most potent armed force in today's turbulent world.

Two significant conclusions may be drawn from the book which may be of cardinal importance in future conflicts—the philosophy of the Red Army soldier in opposition to his officers and the poor command control which is the most glaring weakness of the Soviet forces.

Looking at the first point, Col Ely stresses the ignorance of many of the Red Army soldiers. As a result of party ideology their creed embraces the idea that life is composed of changes, changes meet dogged opposition and therefore life implies eternal warfare. Acceptance of such a concept is merely blind faith. On the other hand, many of the Soviet officers disagree with this ideology for it is directly contrary to what they feel is an absolute prerequisite to the maintenance of high leadership levels within their army. These officers believe that too often creeds, philosophies and panaceas are accepted because of an individual's imperative need to believe in

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something, to belong to something, rather than making a searching examination to analyze its tenets before becoming intellectually convinced. It has been noted by Soviet officers that neither reasoning nor facts which deviated even in the slightest degree from party lines had much effect on the emotional allegiances of the individual soldier. Such a state of affairs will hinder the inculcation of leadership so necessary to the continuing success of the Red Army. A few officers who have escaped the folds of the Iron Curtain maintain that these conflicting groups will be forever at one another's throats, attempting to destroy each other and in the wake of their conflict will come the destruction of the army. This existing condition somewhat parallels that of the totalitarian armies of the recent past, but differs radically from our western armies who believe it is sufficiently difficult for the mass of struggling humanity to make its way against the adversities of nature without the additional burden of fratricidal hatreds. They hold intolerance to be a greater evil than any evil it sets out to destroy.

The author indicates that a lack of initiative and willingness to take responsibility exists throughout the Soviet forces except among the topmost generals and marshals who usually assume responsibility and act decisively. The absence of these vital leadership factors has resulted in poor command control particularly at the battalion and regimental levels. Here, as above in the implied ideologies of the officer group versus the enlisted group, the reader should view with the utmost of caution the author's endeavors to seek out and exploit the weaknesses of a foreign nation's military force.

Col Ely has been engaged in intelligence activities during a major part of his career and served as intelligence officer on Marine Corps and Navy amphibious staffs in World War II, both in the European and Pacific theaters. In writing *The Red Army Today*, his first book, he has made a valuable contribution toward opening the Iron Curtain to reveal Russia's collaboration with Mars.

Reviewed by Capt Victor A. Kleber

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
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